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nest-open-source / nest-learning-thermostat / 5.2 / openssl / 3fb154b149066ecf39dd4652d227ab573007e871 / . / openssl.patches / openssl-55.patch
blob: 2fb25ed3b3e4d56abb72871dc43ec5fc57dfd953 [file] [log] [blame]
diff -ruaN --no-dereference openssl-1.0.1m/Configure openssl/Configure
--- openssl-1.0.1m/Configure 2015-08-17 15:44:12.275201194 -0700
+++ openssl/Configure 2015-08-17 15:44:34.818599289 -0700
@@ -718,6 +718,7 @@
"ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" => "default",
"gmp" => "default",
"jpake" => "experimental",
+ "ecjpake" => "experimental",
"md2" => "default",
"rc5" => "default",
"rfc3779" => "default",
@@ -732,7 +733,7 @@
# This is what $depflags will look like with the above defaults
# (we need this to see if we should advise the user to run "make depend"):
-my $default_depflags = " -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST";
+my $default_depflags = " -DOPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_ECJPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SCTP -DOPENSSL_NO_STORE -DOPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST";
# Explicit "no-..." options will be collected in %disabled along with the defaults.
# To remove something from %disabled, use "enable-foo" (unless it's experimental).
diff -ruaN --no-dereference openssl-1.0.1m/crypto/ecjpake/ecjpake.c openssl/crypto/ecjpake/ecjpake.c
--- openssl-1.0.1m/crypto/ecjpake/ecjpake.c 1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
+++ openssl/crypto/ecjpake/ecjpake.c 2015-08-17 16:31:00.241703253 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,792 @@
+/* ecjpake.c */
+/*
+ * Written by Evgeny Margolis (emargolis@nestlabs.com) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2015.
+ */
+
+#include "ecjpake.h"
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <memory.h>
+
+/*
+ * In the definition, (xa, xb, xc, xd) are Alice's (x1, x2, x3, x4) or
+ * Bob's (x3, x4, x1, x2).
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+ unsigned char *num; /* Must be unique */
+ size_t len;
+} ECJPAKE_ID;
+
+struct ECJPAKE_CTX {
+ /* public values */
+ ECJPAKE_ID local_id;
+ ECJPAKE_ID peer_id;
+ const EC_GROUP *group; /* Elliptic Curve Group */
+ EC_POINT *Gxc; /* Alice's G*x3 or Bob's G*x1 */
+ EC_POINT *Gxd; /* Alice's G*x4 or Bob's G*x2 */
+ /* secret values - should not be revealed publicly and
+ should be cleared when released */
+ BIGNUM *secret; /* The shared secret */
+ BN_CTX *ctx;
+ BIGNUM *xa; /* Alice's x1 or Bob's x3 */
+ BIGNUM *xb; /* Alice's x2 or Bob's x4 */
+ unsigned char key[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* The calculated (shared) key */
+};
+
+static int zkp_init(ECJPAKE_ZKP *zkp, const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+ zkp->Gr = EC_POINT_new(group);
+ if (zkp->Gr == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ zkp->b = BN_new();
+ if (zkp->b == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void zkp_release(ECJPAKE_ZKP *zkp)
+{
+ if (zkp->b != NULL)
+ BN_free(zkp->b);
+ if (zkp->Gr != NULL)
+ EC_POINT_free(zkp->Gr);
+}
+
+#define step_part_init ECJPAKE_STEP2_init
+#define step_part_release ECJPAKE_STEP2_release
+
+int step_part_init(ECJPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
+ p->Gx = EC_POINT_new(ctx->group);
+ if (p->Gx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!zkp_init(&p->zkpx, ctx->group))
+ goto err;
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_STEP_PART_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ step_part_release(p);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void step_part_release(ECJPAKE_STEP_PART *p)
+{
+ zkp_release(&p->zkpx);
+ if (p->Gx != NULL)
+ EC_POINT_free(p->Gx);
+}
+
+int ECJPAKE_STEP1_init(ECJPAKE_STEP1 *s1, const ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (!step_part_init(&s1->p1, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ if (!step_part_init(&s1->p2, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void ECJPAKE_STEP1_release(ECJPAKE_STEP1 *s1)
+{
+ step_part_release(&s1->p2);
+ step_part_release(&s1->p1);
+}
+
+ECJPAKE_CTX *ECJPAKE_CTX_new(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *secret,
+ const unsigned char *local_id_num,
+ const size_t local_id_len,
+ const unsigned char *peer_id_num,
+ const size_t peer_id_len)
+{
+ ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+ /* init ecjpake context */
+ ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+ /* init elliptic curve group */
+ if (group == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ctx->group = group;
+
+ /* init local id */
+ ctx->local_id.num = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(local_id_len);
+ if (ctx->local_id.num == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(ctx->local_id.num, local_id_num, local_id_len);
+ ctx->local_id.len = local_id_len;
+
+ /* init peer id */
+ ctx->peer_id.num = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(peer_id_len);
+ if (ctx->peer_id.num == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(ctx->peer_id.num, peer_id_num, peer_id_len);
+ ctx->peer_id.len = peer_id_len;
+
+ /* init secret */
+ ctx->secret = BN_dup(secret);
+ if (ctx->secret == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* init remaining ecjpake context fields */
+ ctx->Gxc = EC_POINT_new(ctx->group);
+ if (ctx->Gxc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ctx->Gxd = EC_POINT_new(ctx->group);
+ if (ctx->Gxd == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ctx->xa = BN_new();
+ if (ctx->xa == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ctx->xb = BN_new();
+ if (ctx->xb == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ctx->ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx->ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ return ctx;
+
+err:
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ECJPAKE_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void ECJPAKE_CTX_free(ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
+ if (ctx->xb != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(ctx->xb);
+ if (ctx->xa != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(ctx->xa);
+ if (ctx->Gxd != NULL)
+ EC_POINT_free(ctx->Gxd);
+ if (ctx->Gxc != NULL)
+ EC_POINT_free(ctx->Gxc);
+ if (ctx->secret != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(ctx->secret);
+ if (ctx->peer_id.num != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->peer_id.num);
+ if (ctx->local_id.num != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->local_id.num);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ }
+}
+
+static void hashlength(SHA256_CTX *sha, size_t l)
+{
+ unsigned char b[2];
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(l <= 0xffff);
+ b[0] = l >> 8;
+ b[1] = l & 0xff;
+ SHA256_Update(sha, b, 2);
+}
+
+static int hashpoint_default(ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx, SHA256_CTX *sha,
+ const EC_POINT *point)
+{
+ size_t point_len;
+ unsigned char *point_oct = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ point_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(ctx->group, point,
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ if (point_len == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ point_oct = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(point_len);
+ if (point_oct == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ point_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(ctx->group, point,
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, point_oct,
+ point_len, ctx->ctx);
+ if (point_len == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ hashlength(sha, point_len);
+ SHA256_Update(sha, point_oct, point_len);
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ if (point_oct != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(point_oct);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ECJPAKE_HASHPOINT_FUNC_PTR hashpoint = &hashpoint_default;
+
+void ECJPAKE_Set_HashECPoint(ECJPAKE_HASHPOINT_FUNC_PTR hashpoint_custom)
+{
+ hashpoint = hashpoint_custom;
+}
+
+/* h = hash(G, G*r, G*x, ecjpake_id) */
+static int zkp_hash(ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *h, const EC_POINT *zkpG,
+ const ECJPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const int use_local_id)
+{
+ unsigned char md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ SHA256_CTX sha;
+
+ SHA256_Init(&sha);
+ if (!hashpoint(ctx, &sha, zkpG))
+ goto err;
+ if (!hashpoint(ctx, &sha, p->zkpx.Gr))
+ goto err;
+ if (!hashpoint(ctx, &sha, p->Gx))
+ goto err;
+ if (use_local_id)
+ SHA256_Update(&sha, ctx->local_id.num, ctx->local_id.len);
+ else
+ SHA256_Update(&sha, ctx->peer_id.num, ctx->peer_id.len);
+ SHA256_Final(md, &sha);
+ if (BN_bin2bn(md, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, h) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_ZKP_HASH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Generate random number in [1, n - 1] ( i.e. [1, n) ) */
+static int genrand(BIGNUM *rnd, const BIGNUM *n)
+{
+ BIGNUM *nm1 = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ nm1 = BN_new();
+ if (nm1 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ /* n - 1 */
+ if (!BN_copy(nm1, n))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub_word(nm1, 1))
+ goto err;
+ /* random number in [0, n - 1) */
+ if (!BN_rand_range(rnd, nm1))
+ goto err;
+ /* [1, n) */
+ if (!BN_add_word(rnd, 1))
+ goto err;
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ if (!ret)
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_GENRAND, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (nm1 != NULL)
+ BN_free(nm1);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Prove knowledge of x. (Note that p->Gx has already been calculated) */
+static int generate_zkp(ECJPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *x,
+ const EC_POINT *zkpG, ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *order = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *r = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *h = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *t = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ order = BN_new();
+ if (order == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(ctx->group, order, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* r in [1,n-1] */
+ r = BN_new();
+ if (r == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!genrand(r, order))
+ goto err;
+ /* G * r */
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(ctx->group, p->zkpx.Gr, NULL, zkpG, r, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* h = hash(G, G * r, G * x, ecjpake_id) */
+ h = BN_new();
+ if (h == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!zkp_hash(ctx, h, zkpG, p, 1))
+ goto err;
+ /* b = r - x*h */
+ t = BN_new();
+ if (t == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(t, x, h, order, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod_sub(p->zkpx.b, r, t, order, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ if (!ret)
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_GENERATE_ZKP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (t != NULL)
+ BN_free(t);
+ if (h != NULL)
+ BN_free(h);
+ if (r != NULL)
+ BN_free(r);
+ if (order != NULL)
+ BN_free(order);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int verify_zkp(const ECJPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const EC_POINT *zkpG,
+ ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *h = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *point1 = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *point2 = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* h = hash(G, G * r, G * x, ecjpake_id) */
+ h = BN_new();
+ if (h == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!zkp_hash(ctx, h, zkpG, p, 0))
+ goto err;
+ /* point1 = G * b */
+ point1 = EC_POINT_new(ctx->group);
+ if (point1 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(ctx->group, point1, NULL, zkpG, p->zkpx.b, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* point2 = (G * x) * h = G * {h * x} */
+ point2 = EC_POINT_new(ctx->group);
+ if (point2 == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(ctx->group, point2, NULL, p->Gx, h, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* point2 = point1 + point2 = G*{hx} + G*b = G*{hx+b} = G*r (allegedly) */
+ if (!EC_POINT_add(ctx->group, point2, point1, point2, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* verify (point2 == G * r) */
+ if (0 != EC_POINT_cmp(ctx->group, point2, p->zkpx.Gr, ctx->ctx))
+ {
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_VERIFY_ZKP, ECJPAKE_R_ZKP_VERIFY_FAILED);
+ goto clean;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto clean;
+
+err:
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_VERIFY_ZKP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+clean:
+ if (point2 != NULL)
+ EC_POINT_free(point2);
+ if (point1 != NULL)
+ EC_POINT_free(point1);
+ if (h != NULL)
+ BN_free(h);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int step_part_generate(ECJPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *x,
+ const EC_POINT *G, ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(ctx->group, p->Gx, NULL, G, x, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!generate_zkp(p, x, G, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_STEP_PART_GENERATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ECJPAKE_STEP1_generate(ECJPAKE_STEP1 *send, ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *order = NULL;
+ const EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ order = BN_new();
+ if (order == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(ctx->group, order, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!genrand(ctx->xa, order))
+ goto err;
+ if (!genrand(ctx->xb, order))
+ goto err;
+
+ generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(ctx->group);
+ if (!step_part_generate(&send->p1, ctx->xa, generator, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!step_part_generate(&send->p2, ctx->xb, generator, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ if (!ret)
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP1_GENERATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (order != NULL)
+ BN_free(order);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Elliptic Curve Point Validity Check based on p. 25
+ * http://cs.ucsb.edu/~koc/ccs130h/notes/ecdsa-cert.pdf
+ */
+static int EC_POINT_is_legal(const EC_POINT *point, const ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *point_x = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *point_y = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *order = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL;
+ int res = 0;
+
+ /* 1. Verify that point is not at Infinity */
+ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(ctx->group, point))
+ goto illegal_point;
+
+ /* 2. Verify that point.X and point.Y are in the prime field */
+ point_x = BN_new();
+ if (point_x == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ point_y = BN_new();
+ if (point_y == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ p = BN_new();
+ if (p == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(ctx->group, point, point_x,
+ point_y, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(ctx->group, p, NULL, NULL, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_negative(point_x) || BN_is_negative(point_y) ||
+ BN_cmp(point_x, p) >= 0 || BN_cmp(point_y, p) >= 0)
+ goto illegal_point;
+
+ /* 3. Check point lies on the curve */
+ if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(ctx->group, point, ctx->ctx))
+ goto illegal_point;
+
+ /* 4. Check that point*n is at Infinity */
+ order = BN_new();
+ if (order == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(ctx->group);
+ if (tmp_point == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(ctx->group, order, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(ctx->group, tmp_point, NULL, point, order, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(ctx->group, tmp_point))
+ goto illegal_point;
+
+ res = 1;
+ goto clean;
+
+err:
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_EC_POINT_IS_LEGAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto clean;
+illegal_point:
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_EC_POINT_IS_LEGAL, ECJPAKE_R_G_IS_NOT_LEGAL);
+clean:
+ if (tmp_point != NULL)
+ EC_POINT_free(tmp_point);
+ if (order != NULL)
+ BN_free(order);
+ if (p != NULL)
+ BN_free(p);
+ if (point_y != NULL)
+ BN_free(point_y);
+ if (point_x != NULL)
+ BN_free(point_x);
+ return res;
+}
+
+int ECJPAKE_STEP1_process(ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx, const ECJPAKE_STEP1 *received)
+{
+
+ /* check Gxc is a legal point on Elliptic Curve */
+ if (!EC_POINT_is_legal(received->p1.Gx, ctx))
+ {
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP1_PROCESS,
+ ECJPAKE_R_G_TO_THE_X3_IS_NOT_LEGAL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* check Gxd is a legal point on Elliptic Curve */
+ if (!EC_POINT_is_legal(received->p2.Gx, ctx))
+ {
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP1_PROCESS,
+ ECJPAKE_R_G_TO_THE_X4_IS_NOT_LEGAL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* verify ZKP(xc) */
+ if (!verify_zkp(&received->p1, EC_GROUP_get0_generator(ctx->group), ctx))
+ {
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP1_PROCESS,
+ ECJPAKE_R_VERIFY_X3_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* verify ZKP(xd) */
+ if (!verify_zkp(&received->p2, EC_GROUP_get0_generator(ctx->group), ctx))
+ {
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP1_PROCESS,
+ ECJPAKE_R_VERIFY_X4_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Save the points we need for later */
+ if (!EC_POINT_copy(ctx->Gxc, received->p1.Gx) ||
+ !EC_POINT_copy(ctx->Gxd, received->p2.Gx))
+ {
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP1_PROCESS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ECJPAKE_STEP2_generate(ECJPAKE_STEP2 *send, ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *order = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *xbs = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /*-
+ * X = G * {(xa + xc + xd) * xb * s}
+ */
+ point = EC_POINT_new(ctx->group);
+ if (point == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ /* point = G * xa */
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(ctx->group, point, NULL,
+ EC_GROUP_get0_generator(ctx->group), ctx->xa, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* point = G * xa + G * xc = G * {xa + xc} */
+ if (!EC_POINT_add(ctx->group, point, point, ctx->Gxc, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* point = G * {xa + xc} + G * xd = G * {xa + xc + xd} */
+ if (!EC_POINT_add(ctx->group, point, point, ctx->Gxd, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* xbs = xb * s */
+ order = BN_new();
+ if (order == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ xbs = BN_new();
+ if (xbs == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(ctx->group, order, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(xbs, ctx->xb, ctx->secret, order, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*-
+ * ZKP(xb * s)
+ * For STEP2 the generator is:
+ * G' = G * {xa + xc + xd}
+ * which means X is G' * {xb * s}
+ * X = G' * {xb * s} = G * {(xa + xc + xd) * xb * s}
+ */
+ if (!step_part_generate(send, xbs, point, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ if (!ret)
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP2_GENERATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (xbs != NULL)
+ BN_clear_free(xbs);
+ if (order != NULL)
+ BN_free(order);
+ if (point != NULL)
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Gx = G * {(xc + xa + xb) * xd * secret} */
+static int compute_key(ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx, const EC_POINT *Gx)
+{
+ EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+ SHA256_CTX sha;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /*-
+ * K = (Gx - G * {xb * xd * secret}) * xb
+ * = (G * {(xc + xa + xb) * xd * secret - xb * xd * secret}) * xb
+ * = (G * {(xc + xa) * xd * secret}) * xb
+ * = G * {(xa + xc) * xb * xd * secret}
+ * [which is the same regardless of who calculates it]
+ */
+
+ /* point = (G * xd) * xb = G * {xb * xd} */
+ point = EC_POINT_new(ctx->group);
+ if (point == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(ctx->group, point, NULL, ctx->Gxd, ctx->xb, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* point = - G * {xb * xd} */
+ if (!EC_POINT_invert(ctx->group, point, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* point = - G * {xb * xd * secret} */
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(ctx->group, point, NULL, point, ctx->secret, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* point = Gx - G * {xb * xd * secret} */
+ if (!EC_POINT_add(ctx->group, point, Gx, point, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* point = point * xb */
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(ctx->group, point, NULL, point, ctx->xb, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* Hash point to generate shared secret key */
+ SHA256_Init(&sha);
+ if (!hashpoint(ctx, &sha, point))
+ goto err;
+ SHA256_Final(ctx->key, &sha);
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ if (!ret)
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_COMPUTE_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (point != NULL)
+ EC_POINT_clear_free(point);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int ECJPAKE_STEP2_process(ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx, const ECJPAKE_STEP2 *received)
+{
+ BIGNUM *order = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Get Order */
+ order = BN_new();
+ if (order == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(ctx->group, order, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* G' = G * {xc + xa + xb} */
+ /* tmp = xa + xb */
+ tmp = BN_new();
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod_add(tmp, ctx->xa, ctx->xb, order, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* point = G * {xa + xb} */
+ point = EC_POINT_new(ctx->group);
+ if (point == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(ctx->group, point, NULL,
+ EC_GROUP_get0_generator(ctx->group), tmp, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* point = G * {xc + xa + xb} */
+ if (!EC_POINT_add(ctx->group, point, ctx->Gxc, point, ctx->ctx))
+ goto err;
+ /* Verify ZKP */
+ if (!verify_zkp(received, point, ctx))
+ {
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP2_PROCESS, ECJPAKE_R_VERIFY_X4S_FAILED);
+ goto clean;
+ }
+ /* calculate shared secret (key) */
+ if (!compute_key(ctx, received->Gx))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto clean;
+
+err:
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP2_PROCESS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+clean:
+ if (point != NULL)
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
+ if (tmp != NULL)
+ BN_free(tmp);
+ if (order != NULL)
+ BN_free(order);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void ECJPAKE_STEP3A_init(ECJPAKE_STEP3A *s3a)
+{
+}
+
+int ECJPAKE_STEP3A_generate(ECJPAKE_STEP3A *send, ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ SHA256(ctx->key, sizeof ctx->key, send->hhk);
+ SHA256(send->hhk, sizeof send->hhk, send->hhk);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ECJPAKE_STEP3A_process(ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx, const ECJPAKE_STEP3A *received)
+{
+ unsigned char hhk[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+ SHA256(ctx->key, sizeof ctx->key, hhk);
+ SHA256(hhk, sizeof hhk, hhk);
+ if (memcmp(hhk, received->hhk, sizeof hhk)) {
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP3A_PROCESS,
+ ECJPAKE_R_HASH_OF_HASH_OF_KEY_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void ECJPAKE_STEP3A_release(ECJPAKE_STEP3A *s3a)
+{
+}
+
+void ECJPAKE_STEP3B_init(ECJPAKE_STEP3B *s3b)
+{
+}
+
+int ECJPAKE_STEP3B_generate(ECJPAKE_STEP3B *send, ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ SHA256(ctx->key, sizeof(ctx->key), send->hk);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ECJPAKE_STEP3B_process(ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx, const ECJPAKE_STEP3B *received)
+{
+ unsigned char hk[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+ SHA256(ctx->key, sizeof(ctx->key), hk);
+ if (memcmp(hk, received->hk, sizeof(hk))) {
+ ECJPAKEerr(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP3B_PROCESS,
+ ECJPAKE_R_HASH_OF_KEY_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void ECJPAKE_STEP3B_release(ECJPAKE_STEP3B *s3b)
+{
+}
+
+const EC_GROUP *ECJPAKE_get_ecGroup(const ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->group;
+}
+
+const unsigned char *ECJPAKE_get_shared_key(const ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->key;
+}
diff -ruaN --no-dereference openssl-1.0.1m/crypto/ecjpake/ecjpake_err.c openssl/crypto/ecjpake/ecjpake_err.c
--- openssl-1.0.1m/crypto/ecjpake/ecjpake_err.c 1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
+++ openssl/crypto/ecjpake/ecjpake_err.c 2015-08-17 15:44:34.818599289 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/* crypto/ecjpake/ecjpake_err.c */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2010 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
+ * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file,
+ * only reason strings will be preserved.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/ecjpake.h>
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ECJPAKE,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ECJPAKE,0,reason)
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA ECJPAKE_str_functs[] = {
+ {ERR_FUNC(ECJPAKE_F_COMPUTE_KEY), "compute_key"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(ECJPAKE_F_EC_POINT_IS_LEGAL), "EC_POINT_is_legal"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_CTX_NEW), "ECJPAKE_CTX_new"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP1_GENERATE), "ECJPAKE_STEP1_generate"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP1_PROCESS), "ECJPAKE_STEP1_process"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP2_GENERATE), "ECJPAKE_STEP2_generate"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP2_PROCESS), "ECJPAKE_STEP2_process"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP3A_PROCESS), "ECJPAKE_STEP3A_process"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP3B_PROCESS), "ECJPAKE_STEP3B_process"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(ECJPAKE_F_GENERATE_ZKP), "generate_zkp"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(ECJPAKE_F_GENRAND), "genrand"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(ECJPAKE_F_STEP_PART_GENERATE), "step_part_generate"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(ECJPAKE_F_STEP_PART_INIT), "step_part_init"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(ECJPAKE_F_VERIFY_ZKP), "verify_zkp"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(ECJPAKE_F_ZKP_HASH), "zkp_hash"},
+ {0,NULL}
+};
+
+static ERR_STRING_DATA ECJPAKE_str_reasons[] = {
+ {ERR_REASON(ECJPAKE_R_G_IS_NOT_LEGAL), "Gx is not legal"},
+ {ERR_REASON(ECJPAKE_R_G_TO_THE_X3_IS_NOT_LEGAL),
+ "Gx to the x3 is not legal"},
+ {ERR_REASON(ECJPAKE_R_G_TO_THE_X4_IS_NOT_LEGAL),
+ "Gx to the x4 is not legal"},
+ {ERR_REASON(ECJPAKE_R_HASH_OF_HASH_OF_KEY_MISMATCH),
+ "hash of hash of key mismatch"},
+ {ERR_REASON(ECJPAKE_R_HASH_OF_KEY_MISMATCH), "hash of key mismatch"},
+ {ERR_REASON(ECJPAKE_R_VERIFY_X3_FAILED), "verify x3 failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(ECJPAKE_R_VERIFY_X4_FAILED), "verify x4 failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(ECJPAKE_R_VERIFY_X4S_FAILED), "verify x4*s failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(ECJPAKE_R_ZKP_VERIFY_FAILED), "zkp verify failed"},
+ {0,NULL}
+};
+
+#endif
+
+void ERR_load_ECJPAKE_strings(void)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
+
+ if (ERR_func_error_string(ECJPAKE_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+ ERR_load_strings(0, ECJPAKE_str_functs);
+ ERR_load_strings(0, ECJPAKE_str_reasons);
+ }
+#endif
+}
diff -ruaN --no-dereference openssl-1.0.1m/crypto/ecjpake/ecjpake.h openssl/crypto/ecjpake/ecjpake.h
--- openssl-1.0.1m/crypto/ecjpake/ecjpake.h 1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
+++ openssl/crypto/ecjpake/ecjpake.h 2015-08-17 16:29:40.405982099 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+/*
+ * Implement EC J-PAKE, based on J-PAKE as described in
+ * http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/Research/contributions/hao-ryan-2008.pdf
+ *
+ * Useful J-PAKE Java Demo:
+ * http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/feng.hao/files/JPAKEDemo.java
+ *
+ * Useful Elliptic Curve (EC) J-PAKE Java Demo:
+ * http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/feng.hao/files/EllipticCurveJPAKEDemo.java
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_ECJPAKE_H
+# define HEADER_ECJPAKE_H
+
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECJPAKE
+# error ECJPAKE is disabled.
+# endif
+
+# ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+# endif
+
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+typedef struct ECJPAKE_CTX ECJPAKE_CTX;
+
+typedef struct {
+ EC_POINT *Gr; /* G * r (r random) */
+ BIGNUM *b; /* b = r - x * h,
+ h = hash(G, G * r, G * x, name) */
+} ECJPAKE_ZKP;
+
+typedef struct {
+ EC_POINT *Gx; /* G * x in step 1,
+ G * ((xa + xc + xd) * xb * s) in step 2 */
+ ECJPAKE_ZKP zkpx; /* ZKP(x) or ZKP(xb * s) */
+} ECJPAKE_STEP_PART;
+
+typedef struct {
+ ECJPAKE_STEP_PART p1; /* {G * x3, ZKP(x3)} or {G * x1, ZKP(x1)} */
+ ECJPAKE_STEP_PART p2; /* {G * x4, ZKP(x4)} or {G * x2, ZKP(x2)} */
+} ECJPAKE_STEP1;
+
+typedef ECJPAKE_STEP_PART ECJPAKE_STEP2;
+
+typedef struct {
+ unsigned char hhk[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+} ECJPAKE_STEP3A;
+
+typedef struct {
+ unsigned char hk[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+} ECJPAKE_STEP3B;
+
+/*
+ * Defines pointer to the function that calculates SHA256 hash of elliptic curve
+ * point. ECJPAKE implements it's own point hash function.
+ * Use ECJPAKE_Set_HashECPoint() to provide alternative implementation of the
+ * point hash.
+ */
+typedef int(*ECJPAKE_HASHPOINT_FUNC_PTR)(ECJPAKE_CTX *, SHA256_CTX *,
+ const EC_POINT *);
+
+/*
+ * Sets the function that will be used to hash elliptic curve point.
+ * If this function is not called the ecjpake uses it's own (default)
+ * implementation of the point hash function.
+ */
+void ECJPAKE_Set_HashECPoint(ECJPAKE_HASHPOINT_FUNC_PTR hashpoint_custom);
+
+/* Initializes ECJPAKE_CTX with protocol parameters */
+ECJPAKE_CTX *ECJPAKE_CTX_new(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *secret,
+ const unsigned char *local_id_num,
+ const size_t local_id_len,
+ const unsigned char *peer_id_num,
+ const size_t peer_id_len);
+
+/* Releases ECJPAKE_CTX */
+void ECJPAKE_CTX_free(ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Functions to initialize, generate, process, and release ECJPAKE_STEP1 data.
+ * Note that ECJPAKE_STEP1 can be used multiple times before release
+ * without another init.
+ */
+int ECJPAKE_STEP1_init(ECJPAKE_STEP1 *s1, const ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx);
+int ECJPAKE_STEP1_generate(ECJPAKE_STEP1 *send, ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx);
+int ECJPAKE_STEP1_process(ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx, const ECJPAKE_STEP1 *received);
+void ECJPAKE_STEP1_release(ECJPAKE_STEP1 *s1);
+
+/*
+ * Functions to initialize, generate, process, and release ECJPAKE_STEP2 data.
+ * Note that ECJPAKE_STEP2 can be used multiple times before release
+ * without another init.
+ */
+int ECJPAKE_STEP2_init(ECJPAKE_STEP2 *s2, const ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx);
+int ECJPAKE_STEP2_generate(ECJPAKE_STEP2 *send, ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx);
+int ECJPAKE_STEP2_process(ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx, const ECJPAKE_STEP2 *received);
+void ECJPAKE_STEP2_release(ECJPAKE_STEP2 *s2);
+
+/*
+ * Optionally verify the shared key. If the shared secrets do not
+ * match, the two ends will disagree about the shared key, but
+ * otherwise the protocol will succeed.
+ */
+void ECJPAKE_STEP3A_init(ECJPAKE_STEP3A *s3a);
+int ECJPAKE_STEP3A_generate(ECJPAKE_STEP3A *send, ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx);
+int ECJPAKE_STEP3A_process(ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx, const ECJPAKE_STEP3A *received);
+void ECJPAKE_STEP3A_release(ECJPAKE_STEP3A *s3a);
+
+void ECJPAKE_STEP3B_init(ECJPAKE_STEP3B *s3b);
+int ECJPAKE_STEP3B_generate(ECJPAKE_STEP3B *send, ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx);
+int ECJPAKE_STEP3B_process(ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx, const ECJPAKE_STEP3B *received);
+void ECJPAKE_STEP3B_release(ECJPAKE_STEP3B *s3b);
+
+/*
+ * Returns shared secret value. The value belongs to the library and will be
+ * released when ctx is released, and will change when a new handshake is
+ * performed.
+ */
+const unsigned char *ECJPAKE_get_shared_key(const ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* Returns elliptic curve group used in the current ECJPAKE handshake. */
+const EC_GROUP *ECJPAKE_get_ecGroup(const ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+void ERR_load_ECJPAKE_strings(void);
+
+/* Error codes for the ECJPAKE functions. */
+
+/* Function codes. */
+# define ECJPAKE_F_COMPUTE_KEY 100
+# define ECJPAKE_F_EC_POINT_IS_LEGAL 101
+# define ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_CTX_NEW 102
+# define ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP1_GENERATE 103
+# define ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP1_PROCESS 104
+# define ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP2_GENERATE 105
+# define ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP2_PROCESS 106
+# define ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP3A_PROCESS 107
+# define ECJPAKE_F_ECJPAKE_STEP3B_PROCESS 108
+# define ECJPAKE_F_GENERATE_ZKP 109
+# define ECJPAKE_F_GENRAND 110
+# define ECJPAKE_F_STEP_PART_GENERATE 111
+# define ECJPAKE_F_STEP_PART_INIT 112
+# define ECJPAKE_F_VERIFY_ZKP 113
+# define ECJPAKE_F_ZKP_HASH 114
+
+/* Reason codes. */
+# define ECJPAKE_R_G_IS_NOT_LEGAL 100
+# define ECJPAKE_R_G_TO_THE_X3_IS_NOT_LEGAL 101
+# define ECJPAKE_R_G_TO_THE_X4_IS_NOT_LEGAL 102
+# define ECJPAKE_R_HASH_OF_HASH_OF_KEY_MISMATCH 103
+# define ECJPAKE_R_HASH_OF_KEY_MISMATCH 104
+# define ECJPAKE_R_VERIFY_X3_FAILED 105
+# define ECJPAKE_R_VERIFY_X4_FAILED 106
+# define ECJPAKE_R_VERIFY_X4S_FAILED 107
+# define ECJPAKE_R_ZKP_VERIFY_FAILED 108
+
+# ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+# endif
+#endif
diff -ruaN --no-dereference openssl-1.0.1m/crypto/ecjpake/ecjpaketest.c openssl/crypto/ecjpake/ecjpaketest.c
--- openssl-1.0.1m/crypto/ecjpake/ecjpaketest.c 1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
+++ openssl/crypto/ecjpake/ecjpaketest.c 2015-08-17 16:29:40.405982099 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,358 @@
+#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECJPAKE
+
+# include <stdio.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ printf("No EC J-PAKE support\n");
+ return(0);
+}
+
+#else
+
+# include "../e_os.h"
+# include <openssl/ecjpake.h>
+# include <openssl/crypto.h>
+# include <openssl/bio.h>
+# include <openssl/rand.h>
+# include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <memory.h>
+
+static void showkey(const char *name, const unsigned char *key)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ fputs(name, stdout);
+ fputs(" = ", stdout);
+ for (i = 0; i < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+ fprintf(stdout, "%02X", key[i]);
+ putc('\n', stdout);
+}
+
+# if 0
+static void showbn(const char *name, const BIGNUM *bn)
+{
+ fputs(name, stdout);
+ fputs(" = ", stdout);
+ BN_print_fp(stdout, bn);
+ putc('\n', stdout);
+}
+
+static void showpoint(const char *name, const EC_POINT *point, ECJPAKE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ BIGNUM *point_x = BN_new();
+ BIGNUM *point_y = BN_new();
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ const EC_GROUP *group = ECJPAKE_get_ecGroup(ctx);
+
+ if (bn_ctx == NULL || point_y == NULL || point_x == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, point_x, point_y, bn_ctx);
+
+ fputs(name, stdout);
+ showbn(" X:", point_x);
+ fputs(name, stdout);
+ showbn(" Y:", point_y);
+
+err:
+ if (bn_ctx != NULL)
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ if (point_y != NULL)
+ BN_free(point_y);
+ if (point_x != NULL)
+ BN_free(point_x);
+}
+# endif
+
+static const char rnd_seed[] =
+ "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy";
+
+/* generates random length value in a range [len_bottom, len_top] */
+static int generate_rand_len(size_t *rand_len,
+ unsigned int len_bottom,
+ unsigned int len_top)
+{
+ if (len_top > 0xffff || len_bottom > len_top)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)(rand_len), sizeof(size_t)))
+ return 0;
+
+ *rand_len = *rand_len % (len_top - len_bottom + 1) + len_bottom;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int run_ecjpake(ECJPAKE_CTX *alice, ECJPAKE_CTX *bob)
+{
+ ECJPAKE_STEP1 alice_s1;
+ ECJPAKE_STEP1 bob_s1;
+ ECJPAKE_STEP2 alice_s2;
+ ECJPAKE_STEP2 bob_s2;
+ ECJPAKE_STEP3A alice_s3a;
+ ECJPAKE_STEP3B bob_s3b;
+
+ /* Alice --> Bob: Step 1 */
+ fputs("\tAlice --> Bob: Step 1\n", stdout);
+ ECJPAKE_STEP1_init(&alice_s1, alice);
+ ECJPAKE_STEP1_generate(&alice_s1, alice);
+
+ if (!ECJPAKE_STEP1_process(bob, &alice_s1)) {
+ ECJPAKE_STEP1_release(&alice_s1);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bob fails to process Alice's step 1\n");
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ ECJPAKE_STEP1_release(&alice_s1);
+
+ /* Bob --> Alice: Step 1 */
+ fputs("\tBob --> Alice: Step 1\n", stdout);
+ ECJPAKE_STEP1_init(&bob_s1, bob);
+ ECJPAKE_STEP1_generate(&bob_s1, bob);
+ if (!ECJPAKE_STEP1_process(alice, &bob_s1)) {
+ ECJPAKE_STEP1_release(&bob_s1);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Alice fails to process Bob's step 1\n");
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
+ return 2;
+ }
+ ECJPAKE_STEP1_release(&bob_s1);
+
+ /* Alice --> Bob: Step 2 */
+ fputs("\tAlice --> Bob: Step 2\n", stdout);
+ ECJPAKE_STEP2_init(&alice_s2, alice);
+ ECJPAKE_STEP2_generate(&alice_s2, alice);
+ if (!ECJPAKE_STEP2_process(bob, &alice_s2)) {
+ ECJPAKE_STEP2_release(&alice_s2);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Bob fails to process Alice's step 2\n");
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
+ return 3;
+ }
+ ECJPAKE_STEP2_release(&alice_s2);
+
+ /* Bob --> Alice: Step 2 */
+ fputs("\tBob --> Alice: Step 2\n", stdout);
+ ECJPAKE_STEP2_init(&bob_s2, bob);
+ ECJPAKE_STEP2_generate(&bob_s2, bob);
+ if (!ECJPAKE_STEP2_process(alice, &bob_s2)) {
+ ECJPAKE_STEP2_release(&bob_s2);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Alice fails to process Bob's step 2\n");
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
+ return 4;
+ }
+ ECJPAKE_STEP2_release(&bob_s2);
+
+ showkey("\tAlice's key", ECJPAKE_get_shared_key(alice));
+ showkey("\tBob's key ", ECJPAKE_get_shared_key(bob));
+
+ /* Alice --> Bob: Step 3A */
+ fputs("\tAlice --> Bob: Step 3A\n", stdout);
+ ECJPAKE_STEP3A_init(&alice_s3a);
+ ECJPAKE_STEP3A_generate(&alice_s3a, alice);
+ if (!ECJPAKE_STEP3A_process(bob, &alice_s3a)) {
+ ECJPAKE_STEP3A_release(&alice_s3a);
+ return 5;
+ }
+ ECJPAKE_STEP3A_release(&alice_s3a);
+
+ /* Bob --> Alice: Step 3B */
+ fputs("\tBob --> Alice: Step 3B\n", stdout);
+ ECJPAKE_STEP3B_init(&bob_s3b);
+ ECJPAKE_STEP3B_generate(&bob_s3b, bob);
+ if (!ECJPAKE_STEP3B_process(alice, &bob_s3b)) {
+ ECJPAKE_STEP3B_release(&bob_s3b);
+ return 6;
+ }
+ ECJPAKE_STEP3B_release(&bob_s3b);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ ECJPAKE_CTX *alice = NULL;
+ ECJPAKE_CTX *bob = NULL;
+ unsigned char *alice_id_num = NULL;
+ unsigned char *bob_id_num = NULL;
+ size_t alice_id_len;
+ size_t bob_id_len;
+ BIGNUM *secret = NULL;;
+ BIGNUM *secret_wrong = NULL;
+ size_t secret_len;
+ EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
+ BIO *bio_err;
+ int i;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ typedef struct test_curve {
+ int nid;
+ char *name;
+ } test_curve;
+
+ test_curve test_curves[] = {
+ /* SECG PRIME CURVES TESTS */
+ {NID_secp160r1, "SECG Prime-Curve P-160"},
+ /* NIST PRIME CURVES TESTS */
+ {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, "NIST Prime-Curve P-192"},
+ {NID_secp224r1, "NIST Prime-Curve P-224"},
+ {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, "NIST Prime-Curve P-256"},
+ {NID_secp384r1, "NIST Prime-Curve P-384"},
+ {NID_secp521r1, "NIST Prime-Curve P-521"},
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+ /* NIST BINARY CURVES TESTS */
+ {NID_sect163k1, "NIST Binary-Curve K-163"},
+ {NID_sect163r2, "NIST Binary-Curve B-163"},
+ {NID_sect233k1, "NIST Binary-Curve K-233"},
+ {NID_sect233r1, "NIST Binary-Curve B-233"},
+ {NID_sect283k1, "NIST Binary-Curve K-283"},
+ {NID_sect283r1, "NIST Binary-Curve B-283"},
+ {NID_sect409k1, "NIST Binary-Curve K-409"},
+ {NID_sect409r1, "NIST Binary-Curve B-409"},
+ {NID_sect571k1, "NIST Binary-Curve K-571"},
+ {NID_sect571r1, "NIST Binary-Curve B-571"},
+# endif
+ };
+
+ CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
+ CRYPTO_dbg_set_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
+ CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+ CRYPTO_malloc_init();
+# endif
+
+ RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed);
+
+ bio_err = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ if (bio_err == NULL)
+ EXIT(1);
+ BIO_set_fp(bio_err, stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(test_curves)/sizeof(test_curve); i++) {
+
+ fprintf(stdout, "\nTesting ECJPAKE protocol for %s\n",
+ test_curves[i].name);
+
+ group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(test_curves[i].nid);
+ if (group == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* randomize length of a secret in a range [32, 1024] bits */
+ if (!generate_rand_len(&secret_len, 32, 512))
+ goto err;
+ /* randomize secret of secret_len bits */
+ secret = BN_new();
+ if (secret == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_rand(secret, secret_len, 0, 0))
+ goto err;
+ /* randomize alice_id_len in a range [4, 128] bytes */
+ if (!generate_rand_len(&alice_id_len, 4, 128))
+ goto err;
+ /* randomize alice_id_num of alice_id_len bytes */
+ alice_id_num = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(alice_id_len);
+ if (alice_id_num == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!RAND_bytes(alice_id_num, alice_id_len))
+ goto err;
+ /* randomize bob_id_len in a range [4, 128] bytes */
+ if (!generate_rand_len(&bob_id_len, 4, 128))
+ goto err;
+ /* randomize bob_id_num of bob_id_len bytes */
+ bob_id_num = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(bob_id_len);
+ if (bob_id_num == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!RAND_bytes(bob_id_num, bob_id_len))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Initialize ECJPAKE_CTX for Alice and Bob */
+ alice = ECJPAKE_CTX_new(group, secret, alice_id_num, alice_id_len,
+ bob_id_num, bob_id_len);
+ if (alice == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ bob = ECJPAKE_CTX_new(group, secret, bob_id_num, bob_id_len,
+ alice_id_num, alice_id_len);
+ if (bob == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ fprintf(stdout, "Plain EC J-PAKE run\n");
+ if (run_ecjpake(alice, bob) != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Plain EC J-PAKE run failed\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ECJPAKE_CTX_free(bob);
+ bob = NULL;
+ ECJPAKE_CTX_free(alice);
+ alice = NULL;
+
+ /* Now give Alice and Bob different secrets */
+ alice = ECJPAKE_CTX_new(group, secret, alice_id_num, alice_id_len,
+ bob_id_num, bob_id_len);
+ if (alice == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ /* randomize secret_wrong of secret_len bits */
+ secret_wrong = BN_new();
+ if (secret_wrong == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_rand(secret_wrong, secret_len, 0, 0))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_add(secret_wrong, secret_wrong, secret))
+ goto err;
+ bob = ECJPAKE_CTX_new(group, secret_wrong, bob_id_num, bob_id_len,
+ alice_id_num, alice_id_len);
+ if (bob == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ fprintf(stdout, "Mismatch secret EC J-PAKE run\n");
+ if (run_ecjpake(alice, bob) != 5) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Mismatched secret EC J-PAKE run failed\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ECJPAKE_CTX_free(bob);
+ bob = NULL;
+ ECJPAKE_CTX_free(alice);
+ alice = NULL;
+ BN_free(secret);
+ secret = NULL;
+ BN_free(secret_wrong);
+ secret_wrong = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(alice_id_num);
+ alice_id_num = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(bob_id_num);
+ bob_id_num = NULL;
+ EC_GROUP_free(group);
+ group = NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+err:
+ if (ret)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Exiting ecjpaketest with error.\n");
+ if (bob != NULL)
+ ECJPAKE_CTX_free(bob);
+ if (alice != NULL)
+ ECJPAKE_CTX_free(alice);
+ if (secret != NULL)
+ BN_free(secret);
+ if (secret_wrong != NULL)
+ BN_free(secret_wrong);
+ if (alice_id_num != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(alice_id_num);
+ if (bob_id_num != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(bob_id_num);
+ if (group != NULL)
+ EC_GROUP_free(group);
+ BIO_free(bio_err);
+ CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+ ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+ CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp(stderr);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif
diff -ruaN --no-dereference openssl-1.0.1m/crypto/ecjpake/Makefile openssl/crypto/ecjpake/Makefile
--- openssl-1.0.1m/crypto/ecjpake/Makefile 1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
+++ openssl/crypto/ecjpake/Makefile 2015-08-17 15:44:34.818599289 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+#
+# crypto/ecjpake/Makefile
+#
+
+DIR=ecjpake
+TOP=../..
+CC= cc
+INCLUDES= -I.. -I$(TOP) -I../../include
+CFLAG=-g -Wall
+MAKEFILE= Makefile
+AR= ar r
+
+CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
+
+LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a
+LIBOBJ=ecjpake.o ecjpake_err.o
+LIBSRC=ecjpake.c ecjpake_err.c
+
+SRC= $(LIBSRC)
+
+EXHEADER=ecjpake.h
+TEST=ecjpaketest.c
+
+
+top:
+ (cd ../..; $(MAKE) DIRS=crypto SDIRS=$(DIR) sub_all)
+
+all: lib
+
+lib: $(LIBOBJ)
+ $(AR) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ)
+ $(RANLIB) $(LIB) || echo Never mind.
+ @touch lib
+
+links:
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../include/openssl $(EXHEADER)
+ @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../test $(TEST)
+
+install:
+ @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile...
+ @headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist ; \
+ do \
+ ($(INSTALL) -m 644 $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \
+ done;
+
+update: depend
+
+depend:
+ @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile...
+ $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC)
+
+dclean:
+ $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
+ mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE)
+
+clean:
+ rm -f *.s *.o *.obj des lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff
+
+ecjpaketest: top ecjpaketest.c $(LIB)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -Wall -Werror -g -o ecjpaketest ecjpaketest.c $(LIB)
+# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.
+
+ecjpake.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
+ecjpake.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+ecjpake.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
+ecjpake.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
+ecjpake.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+ecjpake.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+ecjpake.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
+ecjpake.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ecjpake.c ecjpake.h
+ecjpake_err.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
+ecjpake_err.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
+ecjpake_err.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
+ecjpake_err.o: ../../include/openssl/ecjpake.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
+ecjpake_err.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
+ecjpake_err.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+ecjpake_err.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
+ecjpake_err.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+ecjpake_err.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
+ecjpake_err.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+ecjpake_err.o: ecjpake_err.c
diff -ruaN --no-dereference openssl-1.0.1m/crypto/err/err_all.c openssl/crypto/err/err_all.c
--- openssl-1.0.1m/crypto/err/err_all.c 2015-08-17 15:44:12.631191688 -0700
+++ openssl/crypto/err/err_all.c 2015-08-17 15:44:34.818599289 -0700
@@ -107,6 +107,9 @@
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
# include <openssl/jpake.h>
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECJPAKE
+# include <openssl/ecjpake.h>
+#endif
void ERR_load_crypto_strings(void)
{
@@ -164,5 +167,8 @@
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
ERR_load_JPAKE_strings();
# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECJPAKE
+ ERR_load_ECJPAKE_strings();
+# endif
#endif
}
diff -ruaN --no-dereference openssl-1.0.1m/crypto/err/err.h openssl/crypto/err/err.h
--- openssl-1.0.1m/crypto/err/err.h 2015-08-17 15:44:12.631191688 -0700
+++ openssl/crypto/err/err.h 2015-08-17 15:44:34.818599289 -0700
@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@
# define ERR_LIB_TS 47
# define ERR_LIB_HMAC 48
# define ERR_LIB_JPAKE 49
+# define ERR_LIB_ECJPAKE 50
# define ERR_LIB_USER 128
@@ -233,6 +234,7 @@
# define TSerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_TS,(f),(r),__FILE__,__LINE__)
# define HMACerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_HMAC,(f),(r),__FILE__,__LINE__)
# define JPAKEerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_JPAKE,(f),(r),__FILE__,__LINE__)
+# define ECJPAKEerr(f,r) ERR_PUT_error(ERR_LIB_ECJPAKE,(f),(r),__FILE__,__LINE__)
/*
* Borland C seems too stupid to be able to shift and do longs in the
diff -ruaN --no-dereference openssl-1.0.1m/crypto/err/openssl.ec openssl/crypto/err/openssl.ec
--- openssl-1.0.1m/crypto/err/openssl.ec 2015-08-17 15:44:12.635191581 -0700
+++ openssl/crypto/err/openssl.ec 2015-08-17 15:44:34.818599289 -0700
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
L HMAC crypto/hmac/hmac.h crypto/hmac/hmac_err.c
L CMS crypto/cms/cms.h crypto/cms/cms_err.c
L JPAKE crypto/jpake/jpake.h crypto/jpake/jpake_err.c
+L ECJPAKE crypto/ecjpake/ecjpake.h crypto/ecjpake/ecjpake_err.c
# additional header files to be scanned for function names
L NONE crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h NONE
diff -ruaN --no-dereference openssl-1.0.1m/Makefile.org openssl/Makefile.org
--- openssl-1.0.1m/Makefile.org 2015-08-17 15:44:12.715189445 -0700
+++ openssl/Makefile.org 2015-08-17 15:44:34.818599289 -0700
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@
bn ec rsa dsa ecdsa dh ecdh dso engine \
buffer bio stack lhash rand err \
evp asn1 pem x509 x509v3 conf txt_db pkcs7 pkcs12 comp ocsp ui krb5 \
- cms pqueue ts jpake srp store cmac
+ cms pqueue ts jpake ecjpake srp store cmac
# keep in mind that the above list is adjusted by ./Configure
# according to no-xxx arguments...
diff -ruaN --no-dereference openssl-1.0.1m/test/Makefile openssl/test/Makefile
--- openssl-1.0.1m/test/Makefile 2015-08-17 15:44:12.759188270 -0700
+++ openssl/test/Makefile 2015-08-17 16:50:00.574984277 -0700
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
EVPEXTRATEST=evp_extra_test
IGETEST= igetest
JPAKETEST= jpaketest
+ECJPAKETEST= ecjpaketest
SRPTEST= srptest
ASN1TEST= asn1test
HEARTBEATTEST= heartbeat_test
@@ -71,7 +72,7 @@
EXE= $(BNTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECDSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECDHTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(IDEATEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
$(MD2TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(MD4TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(MD5TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(HMACTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(WPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
- $(RC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RC4TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RC5TEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
+ $(RC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RC4TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RC5TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECJPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
$(DESTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA1TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA256TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA512TEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
$(MDC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RMDTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
$(RANDTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DHTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ENGINETEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
@@ -86,7 +87,7 @@
$(HMACTEST).o $(WPTEST).o \
$(RC2TEST).o $(RC4TEST).o $(RC5TEST).o \
$(DESTEST).o $(SHATEST).o $(SHA1TEST).o $(SHA256TEST).o $(SHA512TEST).o \
- $(MDC2TEST).o $(RMDTEST).o \
+ $(MDC2TEST).o $(RMDTEST).o $(ECJPAKETEST).o \
$(RANDTEST).o $(DHTEST).o $(ENGINETEST).o $(CASTTEST).o \
$(BFTEST).o $(SSLTEST).o $(DSATEST).o $(EXPTEST).o $(RSATEST).o \
$(EVPTEST).o $(EVPEXTRATEST).o $(IGETEST).o $(JPAKETEST).o $(ASN1TEST).o \
@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@
SRC= $(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c $(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
$(MD2TEST).c $(MD4TEST).c $(MD5TEST).c \
- $(HMACTEST).c $(WPTEST).c \
+ $(HMACTEST).c $(WPTEST).c $(ECJPAKETEST).c \
$(RC2TEST).c $(RC4TEST).c $(RC5TEST).c \
$(DESTEST).c $(SHATEST).c $(SHA1TEST).c $(MDC2TEST).c $(RMDTEST).c \
$(RANDTEST).c $(DHTEST).c $(ENGINETEST).c $(CASTTEST).c \
@@ -137,7 +138,7 @@
alltests: \
test_des test_idea test_sha test_md4 test_md5 test_hmac \
- test_md2 test_mdc2 test_wp \
+ test_md2 test_mdc2 test_wp test_ecjpake \
test_rmd test_rc2 test_rc4 test_rc5 test_bf test_cast test_aes \
test_rand test_bn test_ec test_ecdsa test_ecdh \
test_enc test_x509 test_rsa test_crl test_sid \
@@ -319,6 +320,10 @@
@echo "Test JPAKE"
../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(JPAKETEST)
+test_ecjpake: $(ECJPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT)
+ @echo "Test ECJPAKE"
+ ../util/shlib_wrap.sh ./$(ECJPAKETEST)
+
test_cms:
@echo "CMS consistency test"
$(PERL) cms-test.pl
@@ -489,6 +494,9 @@
$(JPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(JPAKETEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
@target=$(JPAKETEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+$(ECJPAKETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(ECJPAKETEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
+ @target=$(ECJPAKETEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
+
$(ASN1TEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(ASN1TEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
@target=$(ASN1TEST); $(BUILD_CMD)
@@ -593,6 +601,11 @@
ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h
ecdsatest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
ecdsatest.o: ecdsatest.c
+ecjpaketest.o: ../include/openssl/buffer.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h
+ecjpaketest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+ecjpaketest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
+ecjpaketest.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
+ecjpaketest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ecjpaketest.c
ectest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h ../include/openssl/bio.h
ectest.o: ../include/openssl/bn.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
ectest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h