| # /etc/default/nss |
| # This file can theoretically contain a bunch of customization variables |
| # for Name Service Switch in the GNU C library. For now there are only |
| # four variables: |
| # |
| # NETID_AUTHORITATIVE |
| # If set to TRUE, the initgroups() function will accept the information |
| # from the netid.byname NIS map as authoritative. This can speed up the |
| # function significantly if the group.byname map is large. The content |
| # of the netid.byname map is used AS IS. The system administrator has |
| # to make sure it is correctly generated. |
| #NETID_AUTHORITATIVE=TRUE |
| # |
| # SERVICES_AUTHORITATIVE |
| # If set to TRUE, the getservbyname{,_r}() function will assume |
| # services.byservicename NIS map exists and is authoritative, particularly |
| # that it contains both keys with /proto and without /proto for both |
| # primary service names and service aliases. The system administrator |
| # has to make sure it is correctly generated. |
| #SERVICES_AUTHORITATIVE=TRUE |
| # |
| # SETENT_BATCH_READ |
| # If set to TRUE, various setXXent() functions will read the entire |
| # database at once and then hand out the requests one by one from |
| # memory with every getXXent() call. Otherwise each getXXent() call |
| # might result into a network communication with the server to get |
| # the next entry. |
| #SETENT_BATCH_READ=TRUE |
| # |
| # ADJUNCT_AS_SHADOW |
| # If set to TRUE, the passwd routines in the NIS NSS module will not |
| # use the passwd.adjunct.byname tables to fill in the password data |
| # in the passwd structure. This is a security problem if the NIS |
| # server cannot be trusted to send the passwd.adjuct table only to |
| # privileged clients. Instead the passwd.adjunct.byname table is |
| # used to synthesize the shadow.byname table if it does not exist. |
| #ADJUNCT_AS_SHADOW=TRUE |
