| /* |
| * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator |
| * Copyright (c) 2004-2011, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> |
| * |
| * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license. |
| * See README for more details. |
| */ |
| |
| #include "utils/includes.h" |
| |
| #include "utils/common.h" |
| #include "utils/eloop.h" |
| #include "utils/state_machine.h" |
| #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h" |
| #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h" |
| #include "crypto/crypto.h" |
| #include "crypto/sha1.h" |
| #include "crypto/sha256.h" |
| #include "crypto/random.h" |
| #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h" |
| #include "ap_config.h" |
| #include "ieee802_11.h" |
| #include "wpa_auth.h" |
| #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h" |
| #include "wpa_auth_i.h" |
| #include "wpa_auth_ie.h" |
| |
| #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine |
| #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA" |
| #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr |
| |
| |
| static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx); |
| static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); |
| static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk *PTK, u8 *data, size_t data_len); |
| static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx); |
| static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_group *group); |
| static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); |
| static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_group *group); |
| static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_group *group); |
| |
| static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount = 4; |
| static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount = 4; |
| static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first = 100; /* ms */ |
| static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq = 1000; /* ms */ |
| static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group = 500; /* ms */ |
| |
| /* TODO: make these configurable */ |
| static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime = 43200; |
| static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold = 70; |
| static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout = 60; |
| |
| |
| static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report( |
| struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr) |
| { |
| if (wpa_auth->cb.mic_failure_report) |
| return wpa_auth->cb.mic_failure_report(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| const u8 *addr, wpa_eapol_variable var, |
| int value) |
| { |
| if (wpa_auth->cb.set_eapol) |
| wpa_auth->cb.set_eapol(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, var, value); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| const u8 *addr, wpa_eapol_variable var) |
| { |
| if (wpa_auth->cb.get_eapol == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| return wpa_auth->cb.get_eapol(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, var); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static inline const u8 * wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| const u8 *addr, const u8 *prev_psk) |
| { |
| if (wpa_auth->cb.get_psk == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| return wpa_auth->cb.get_psk(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, prev_psk); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| const u8 *addr, u8 *msk, size_t *len) |
| { |
| if (wpa_auth->cb.get_msk == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| return wpa_auth->cb.get_msk(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, msk, len); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| int vlan_id, |
| enum wpa_alg alg, const u8 *addr, int idx, |
| u8 *key, size_t key_len) |
| { |
| if (wpa_auth->cb.set_key == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| return wpa_auth->cb.set_key(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, vlan_id, alg, addr, idx, |
| key, key_len); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| const u8 *addr, int idx, u8 *seq) |
| { |
| if (wpa_auth->cb.get_seqnum == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| return wpa_auth->cb.get_seqnum(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, idx, seq); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static inline int |
| wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr, |
| const u8 *data, size_t data_len, int encrypt) |
| { |
| if (wpa_auth->cb.send_eapol == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| return wpa_auth->cb.send_eapol(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, data, data_len, |
| encrypt); |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| int (*cb)(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx), |
| void *cb_ctx) |
| { |
| if (wpa_auth->cb.for_each_sta == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| return wpa_auth->cb.for_each_sta(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, cb, cb_ctx); |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| int (*cb)(struct wpa_authenticator *a, void *ctx), |
| void *cb_ctx) |
| { |
| if (wpa_auth->cb.for_each_auth == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| return wpa_auth->cb.for_each_auth(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, cb, cb_ctx); |
| } |
| |
| |
| void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr, |
| logger_level level, const char *txt) |
| { |
| if (wpa_auth->cb.logger == NULL) |
| return; |
| wpa_auth->cb.logger(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, level, txt); |
| } |
| |
| |
| void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr, |
| logger_level level, const char *fmt, ...) |
| { |
| char *format; |
| int maxlen; |
| va_list ap; |
| |
| if (wpa_auth->cb.logger == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| maxlen = os_strlen(fmt) + 100; |
| format = os_malloc(maxlen); |
| if (!format) |
| return; |
| |
| va_start(ap, fmt); |
| vsnprintf(format, maxlen, fmt, ap); |
| va_end(ap); |
| |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, addr, level, format); |
| |
| os_free(format); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| const u8 *addr) |
| { |
| if (wpa_auth->cb.disconnect == NULL) |
| return; |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR, MAC2STR(addr)); |
| wpa_auth->cb.disconnect(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, |
| WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int wpa_use_aes_cmac(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) |
| ret = 1; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) |
| ret = 1; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx) |
| { |
| struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx; |
| |
| if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth->group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Failed to get random data for WPA " |
| "initialization."); |
| } else { |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, NULL, LOGGER_DEBUG, "GMK rekeyd"); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GMK", |
| wpa_auth->group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN); |
| } |
| |
| if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey) { |
| eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey, 0, |
| wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx) |
| { |
| struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx; |
| struct wpa_group *group; |
| |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, NULL, LOGGER_DEBUG, "rekeying GTK"); |
| for (group = wpa_auth->group; group; group = group->next) { |
| group->GTKReKey = TRUE; |
| do { |
| group->changed = FALSE; |
| wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group); |
| } while (group->changed); |
| } |
| |
| if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey) { |
| eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey, |
| 0, wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx) |
| { |
| struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx; |
| struct wpa_state_machine *sm = timeout_ctx; |
| |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, "rekeying PTK"); |
| wpa_request_new_ptk(sm); |
| wpa_sm_step(sm); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx) |
| { |
| if (sm->pmksa == ctx) |
| sm->pmksa = NULL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry, |
| void *ctx) |
| { |
| struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = ctx; |
| wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb, entry); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_group *group) |
| { |
| u8 buf[ETH_ALEN + 8 + sizeof(group)]; |
| u8 rkey[32]; |
| |
| if (random_get_bytes(group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GMK", group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN); |
| |
| /* |
| * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter", |
| * Local MAC Address || Time) |
| */ |
| os_memcpy(buf, wpa_auth->addr, ETH_ALEN); |
| wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf + ETH_ALEN); |
| os_memcpy(buf + ETH_ALEN + 8, &group, sizeof(group)); |
| if (random_get_bytes(rkey, sizeof(rkey)) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (sha1_prf(rkey, sizeof(rkey), "Init Counter", buf, sizeof(buf), |
| group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Key Counter", |
| group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static struct wpa_group * wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| int vlan_id, int delay_init) |
| { |
| struct wpa_group *group; |
| |
| group = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group)); |
| if (group == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| group->GTKAuthenticator = TRUE; |
| group->vlan_id = vlan_id; |
| group->GTK_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group); |
| |
| if (random_pool_ready() != 1) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool " |
| "for secure operations - update keys later when " |
| "the first station connects"); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be |
| * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to |
| * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness |
| * on embedded devices. |
| */ |
| if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group) < 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Failed to get random data for WPA " |
| "initialization."); |
| os_free(group); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| group->GInit = TRUE; |
| if (delay_init) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Delay group state machine start " |
| "until Beacon frames have been configured"); |
| /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */ |
| } else { |
| wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group); |
| group->GInit = FALSE; |
| wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group); |
| } |
| |
| return group; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator |
| * @addr: Authenticator address |
| * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator |
| * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator |
| * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure |
| */ |
| struct wpa_authenticator * wpa_init(const u8 *addr, |
| struct wpa_auth_config *conf, |
| struct wpa_auth_callbacks *cb) |
| { |
| struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth; |
| |
| wpa_auth = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator)); |
| if (wpa_auth == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| os_memcpy(wpa_auth->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN); |
| os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->conf, conf, sizeof(*conf)); |
| os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->cb, cb, sizeof(*cb)); |
| |
| if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not generate WPA IE."); |
| os_free(wpa_auth); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| wpa_auth->group = wpa_group_init(wpa_auth, 0, 1); |
| if (wpa_auth->group == NULL) { |
| os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie); |
| os_free(wpa_auth); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| wpa_auth->pmksa = pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb, |
| wpa_auth); |
| if (wpa_auth->pmksa == NULL) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PMKSA cache initialization failed."); |
| os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie); |
| os_free(wpa_auth); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache = wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init(); |
| if (wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache == NULL) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT PMK cache initialization failed."); |
| os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie); |
| pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth->pmksa); |
| os_free(wpa_auth); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| |
| if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey) { |
| eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey, 0, |
| wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey) { |
| eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey, 0, |
| wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| return wpa_auth; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth) |
| { |
| struct wpa_group *group = wpa_auth->group; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial " |
| "keys"); |
| wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group); |
| group->GInit = FALSE; |
| wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator |
| * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init() |
| */ |
| void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth) |
| { |
| struct wpa_group *group, *prev; |
| |
| eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL); |
| eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL); |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY |
| while (wpa_auth->stsl_negotiations) |
| wpa_stsl_remove(wpa_auth, wpa_auth->stsl_negotiations); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */ |
| |
| pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth->pmksa); |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache); |
| wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache = NULL; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| |
| os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie); |
| |
| group = wpa_auth->group; |
| while (group) { |
| prev = group; |
| group = group->next; |
| os_free(prev); |
| } |
| |
| os_free(wpa_auth); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration |
| * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init() |
| * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator |
| */ |
| int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_auth_config *conf) |
| { |
| struct wpa_group *group; |
| if (wpa_auth == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->conf, conf, sizeof(*conf)); |
| if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not generate WPA IE."); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new |
| * configuration. |
| */ |
| group = wpa_auth->group; |
| group->GTK_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group); |
| group->GInit = TRUE; |
| wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group); |
| group->GInit = FALSE; |
| wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| struct wpa_state_machine * |
| wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr) |
| { |
| struct wpa_state_machine *sm; |
| |
| sm = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine)); |
| if (sm == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| os_memcpy(sm->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN); |
| |
| sm->wpa_auth = wpa_auth; |
| sm->group = wpa_auth->group; |
| |
| return sm; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_state_machine *sm) |
| { |
| if (wpa_auth == NULL || !wpa_auth->conf.wpa || sm == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| if (sm->ft_completed) { |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "FT authentication already completed - do not " |
| "start 4-way handshake"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| |
| if (sm->started) { |
| os_memset(&sm->key_replay, 0, sizeof(sm->key_replay)); |
| sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = TRUE; |
| return wpa_sm_step(sm); |
| } |
| |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "start authentication"); |
| sm->started = 1; |
| |
| sm->Init = TRUE; |
| if (wpa_sm_step(sm) == 1) |
| return 1; /* should not really happen */ |
| sm->Init = FALSE; |
| sm->AuthenticationRequest = TRUE; |
| return wpa_sm_step(sm); |
| } |
| |
| |
| void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) |
| { |
| /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA |
| * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the |
| * STA has not yet been removed. */ |
| if (sm == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| sm->wpa_key_mgmt = 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) |
| { |
| if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) { |
| sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--; |
| sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE; |
| } |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| os_free(sm->assoc_resp_ftie); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| os_free(sm->last_rx_eapol_key); |
| os_free(sm->wpa_ie); |
| os_free(sm); |
| } |
| |
| |
| void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) |
| { |
| if (sm == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_strict_rekey && sm->has_GTK) { |
| wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA " |
| "is leaving"); |
| eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, sm->wpa_auth, NULL); |
| eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk, sm->wpa_auth, |
| NULL); |
| } |
| |
| eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, sm->wpa_auth, sm); |
| sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0; |
| eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step, sm, NULL); |
| eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm); |
| if (sm->in_step_loop) { |
| /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running. |
| * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */ |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Registering pending STA state " |
| "machine deinit for " MACSTR, MAC2STR(sm->addr)); |
| sm->pending_deinit = 1; |
| } else |
| wpa_free_sta_sm(sm); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) |
| { |
| if (sm == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| sm->PTKRequest = TRUE; |
| sm->PTK_valid = 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter *ctr, |
| const u8 *replay_counter) |
| { |
| int i; |
| for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) { |
| if (!ctr[i].valid) |
| break; |
| if (os_memcmp(replay_counter, ctr[i].counter, |
| WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0) |
| return 1; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter *ctr, |
| const u8 *replay_counter) |
| { |
| int i; |
| for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) { |
| if (ctr[i].valid && |
| (replay_counter == NULL || |
| os_memcmp(replay_counter, ctr[i].counter, |
| WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0)) |
| ctr[i].valid = FALSE; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_state_machine *sm, |
| struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *kde) |
| { |
| struct wpa_ie_data ie; |
| struct rsn_mdie *mdie; |
| |
| if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde->rsn_ie, kde->rsn_ie_len, &ie) < 0 || |
| ie.num_pmkid != 1 || ie.pmkid == NULL) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: No PMKR1Name in " |
| "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| os_memcpy(sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, ie.pmkid, PMKID_LEN); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant", |
| sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, PMKID_LEN); |
| |
| if (!kde->mdie || !kde->ftie) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake " |
| "message 2/4", kde->mdie ? "FTIE" : "MDIE"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| mdie = (struct rsn_mdie *) (kde->mdie + 2); |
| if (kde->mdie[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) || |
| os_memcmp(wpa_auth->conf.mobility_domain, mdie->mobility_domain, |
| MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN) != 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: MDIE mismatch"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (sm->assoc_resp_ftie && |
| (kde->ftie[1] != sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1] || |
| os_memcmp(kde->ftie, sm->assoc_resp_ftie, |
| 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]) != 0)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE mismatch"); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4", |
| kde->ftie, kde->ftie_len); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp", |
| sm->assoc_resp_ftie, 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| |
| |
| static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int group) |
| { |
| /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */ |
| wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "received EAPOL-Key Error Request " |
| "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))", |
| group); |
| |
| if (group && wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) { |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "ignore Michael MIC failure report since " |
| "group cipher is not TKIP"); |
| } else if (!group && sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) { |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "ignore Michael MIC failure report since " |
| "pairwise cipher is not TKIP"); |
| } else { |
| if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth, sm->addr) > 0) |
| return 1; /* STA entry was removed */ |
| sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures++; |
| wpa_auth->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures++; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since |
| * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway. |
| */ |
| wpa_request_new_ptk(sm); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_state_machine *sm, |
| u8 *data, size_t data_len) |
| { |
| struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr; |
| struct wpa_eapol_key *key; |
| u16 key_info, key_data_length; |
| enum { PAIRWISE_2, PAIRWISE_4, GROUP_2, REQUEST, |
| SMK_M1, SMK_M3, SMK_ERROR } msg; |
| char *msgtxt; |
| struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde; |
| int ft; |
| const u8 *eapol_key_ie; |
| size_t eapol_key_ie_len; |
| |
| if (wpa_auth == NULL || !wpa_auth->conf.wpa || sm == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| if (data_len < sizeof(*hdr) + sizeof(*key)) |
| return; |
| |
| hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) data; |
| key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1); |
| key_info = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_info); |
| key_data_length = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_data_length); |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR |
| " key_info=0x%x type=%u key_data_length=%u", |
| MAC2STR(sm->addr), key_info, key->type, key_data_length); |
| if (key_data_length > data_len - sizeof(*hdr) - sizeof(*key)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - " |
| "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)", |
| key_data_length, |
| (unsigned long) (data_len - sizeof(*hdr) - |
| sizeof(*key))); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) { |
| if (key->type == EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA) { |
| /* |
| * Some deployed station implementations seem to send |
| * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode. |
| */ |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key " |
| "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode"); |
| } else if (key->type != EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with " |
| "unexpected type %d in RSN mode", |
| key->type); |
| return; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (key->type != EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with " |
| "unexpected type %d in WPA mode", |
| key->type); |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key->key_nonce, |
| WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received Replay Counter", |
| key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN); |
| |
| /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys |
| * are set */ |
| |
| if ((key_info & (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE | WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST)) == |
| (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE | WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST)) { |
| if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR) { |
| msg = SMK_ERROR; |
| msgtxt = "SMK Error"; |
| } else { |
| msg = SMK_M1; |
| msgtxt = "SMK M1"; |
| } |
| } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE) { |
| msg = SMK_M3; |
| msgtxt = "SMK M3"; |
| } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) { |
| msg = REQUEST; |
| msgtxt = "Request"; |
| } else if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE)) { |
| msg = GROUP_2; |
| msgtxt = "2/2 Group"; |
| } else if (key_data_length == 0) { |
| msg = PAIRWISE_4; |
| msgtxt = "4/4 Pairwise"; |
| } else { |
| msg = PAIRWISE_2; |
| msgtxt = "2/4 Pairwise"; |
| } |
| |
| /* TODO: key_info type validation for PeerKey */ |
| if (msg == REQUEST || msg == PAIRWISE_2 || msg == PAIRWISE_4 || |
| msg == GROUP_2) { |
| u16 ver = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK; |
| if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP || |
| sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) { |
| if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm) && |
| ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) { |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, |
| LOGGER_WARNING, |
| "advertised support for " |
| "AES-128-CMAC, but did not " |
| "use it"); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (!wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm) && |
| ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES) { |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, |
| LOGGER_WARNING, |
| "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES " |
| "with CCMP/GCMP"); |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) { |
| if (sm->req_replay_counter_used && |
| os_memcmp(key->replay_counter, sm->req_replay_counter, |
| WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) <= 0) { |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_WARNING, |
| "received EAPOL-Key request with " |
| "replayed counter"); |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) && |
| !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->key_replay, key->replay_counter)) { |
| int i; |
| |
| if (msg == PAIRWISE_2 && |
| wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->prev_key_replay, |
| key->replay_counter) && |
| sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING && |
| os_memcmp(sm->SNonce, key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) |
| { |
| /* |
| * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP |
| * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This |
| * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the |
| * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated |
| * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4. |
| */ |
| wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "Process SNonce update from STA " |
| "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key " |
| "1/4"); |
| sm->update_snonce = 1; |
| wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->prev_key_replay, |
| key->replay_counter); |
| goto continue_processing; |
| } |
| |
| if (msg == PAIRWISE_2 && |
| wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->prev_key_replay, |
| key->replay_counter) && |
| sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING) { |
| wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - " |
| "SNonce did not change", msgtxt); |
| } else { |
| wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "received EAPOL-Key %s with " |
| "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt); |
| } |
| for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) { |
| if (!sm->key_replay[i].valid) |
| break; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "pending replay counter", |
| sm->key_replay[i].counter, |
| WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN); |
| } |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "received replay counter", |
| key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| continue_processing: |
| switch (msg) { |
| case PAIRWISE_2: |
| if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKSTART && |
| sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING && |
| (!sm->update_snonce || |
| sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING)) { |
| wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in " |
| "invalid state (%d) - dropped", |
| sm->wpa_ptk_state); |
| return; |
| } |
| random_add_randomness(key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| if (sm->group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy) { |
| /* |
| * The system did not have enough entropy to generate |
| * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way |
| * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the |
| * information from it. Once enough entropy is |
| * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key |
| * Counter update and the station will be allowed to |
| * continue. |
| */ |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to " |
| "collect more entropy for random number " |
| "generation"); |
| random_mark_pool_ready(); |
| wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr); |
| return; |
| } |
| if (wpa_parse_kde_ies((u8 *) (key + 1), key_data_length, |
| &kde) < 0) { |
| wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with " |
| "invalid Key Data contents"); |
| return; |
| } |
| if (kde.rsn_ie) { |
| eapol_key_ie = kde.rsn_ie; |
| eapol_key_ie_len = kde.rsn_ie_len; |
| } else { |
| eapol_key_ie = kde.wpa_ie; |
| eapol_key_ie_len = kde.wpa_ie_len; |
| } |
| ft = sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 && |
| wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt); |
| if (sm->wpa_ie == NULL || |
| wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft, |
| sm->wpa_ie, sm->wpa_ie_len, |
| eapol_key_ie, eapol_key_ie_len)) { |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not " |
| "match with msg 2/4"); |
| if (sm->wpa_ie) { |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA IE in AssocReq", |
| sm->wpa_ie, sm->wpa_ie_len); |
| } |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA IE in msg 2/4", |
| eapol_key_ie, eapol_key_ie_len); |
| /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */ |
| wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr); |
| return; |
| } |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| if (ft && ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth, sm, &kde) < 0) { |
| wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr); |
| return; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| break; |
| case PAIRWISE_4: |
| if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING || |
| !sm->PTK_valid) { |
| wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in " |
| "invalid state (%d) - dropped", |
| sm->wpa_ptk_state); |
| return; |
| } |
| break; |
| case GROUP_2: |
| if (sm->wpa_ptk_group_state != WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING |
| || !sm->PTK_valid) { |
| wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in " |
| "invalid state (%d) - dropped", |
| sm->wpa_ptk_group_state); |
| return; |
| } |
| break; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY |
| case SMK_M1: |
| case SMK_M3: |
| case SMK_ERROR: |
| if (!wpa_auth->conf.peerkey) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: SMK M1/M3/Error, but " |
| "PeerKey use disabled - ignoring message"); |
| return; |
| } |
| if (!sm->PTK_valid) { |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "received EAPOL-Key msg SMK in " |
| "invalid state - dropped"); |
| return; |
| } |
| break; |
| #else /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */ |
| case SMK_M1: |
| case SMK_M3: |
| case SMK_ERROR: |
| return; /* STSL disabled - ignore SMK messages */ |
| #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */ |
| case REQUEST: |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt); |
| |
| if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK) { |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set"); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) { |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set"); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| sm->MICVerified = FALSE; |
| if (sm->PTK_valid && !sm->update_snonce) { |
| if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&sm->PTK, data, data_len)) { |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC"); |
| return; |
| } |
| sm->MICVerified = TRUE; |
| eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm); |
| sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) { |
| if (sm->MICVerified) { |
| sm->req_replay_counter_used = 1; |
| os_memcpy(sm->req_replay_counter, key->replay_counter, |
| WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN); |
| } else { |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "received EAPOL-Key request with " |
| "invalid MIC"); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used; |
| * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted, |
| * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it. |
| */ |
| if (msg == SMK_ERROR) { |
| #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY |
| wpa_smk_error(wpa_auth, sm, key); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */ |
| return; |
| } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR) { |
| if (wpa_receive_error_report( |
| wpa_auth, sm, |
| !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE)) > 0) |
| return; /* STA entry was removed */ |
| } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE) { |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "received EAPOL-Key Request for new " |
| "4-Way Handshake"); |
| wpa_request_new_ptk(sm); |
| #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY |
| } else if (msg == SMK_M1) { |
| wpa_smk_m1(wpa_auth, sm, key); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */ |
| } else if (key_data_length > 0 && |
| wpa_parse_kde_ies((const u8 *) (key + 1), |
| key_data_length, &kde) == 0 && |
| kde.mac_addr) { |
| } else { |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK " |
| "rekeying"); |
| eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL); |
| wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth, NULL); |
| } |
| } else { |
| /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */ |
| wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->key_replay, |
| key->replay_counter); |
| |
| if (msg == PAIRWISE_2) { |
| /* |
| * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in |
| * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is |
| * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another |
| * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around |
| * unexpected supplicant behavior. |
| */ |
| os_memcpy(sm->prev_key_replay, sm->key_replay, |
| sizeof(sm->key_replay)); |
| } else { |
| os_memset(sm->prev_key_replay, 0, |
| sizeof(sm->prev_key_replay)); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and |
| * do not get copied again. |
| */ |
| wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->key_replay, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY |
| if (msg == SMK_M3) { |
| wpa_smk_m3(wpa_auth, sm, key); |
| return; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */ |
| |
| os_free(sm->last_rx_eapol_key); |
| sm->last_rx_eapol_key = os_malloc(data_len); |
| if (sm->last_rx_eapol_key == NULL) |
| return; |
| os_memcpy(sm->last_rx_eapol_key, data, data_len); |
| sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len = data_len; |
| |
| sm->rx_eapol_key_secure = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE); |
| sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = TRUE; |
| sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE); |
| sm->EAPOLKeyRequest = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST); |
| os_memcpy(sm->SNonce, key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| wpa_sm_step(sm); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8 *gmk, const char *label, const u8 *addr, |
| const u8 *gnonce, u8 *gtk, size_t gtk_len) |
| { |
| u8 data[ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN + 8 + 16]; |
| u8 *pos; |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion", |
| * AA || GNonce || Time || random data) |
| * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and |
| * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation |
| * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be |
| * exactly same. |
| */ |
| os_memcpy(data, addr, ETH_ALEN); |
| os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, gnonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| pos = data + ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN; |
| wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos); |
| pos += 8; |
| if (random_get_bytes(pos, 16) < 0) |
| ret = -1; |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W |
| sha256_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data), gtk, gtk_len); |
| #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ |
| if (sha1_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data), gtk, gtk_len) |
| < 0) |
| ret = -1; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx) |
| { |
| struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx; |
| struct wpa_state_machine *sm = timeout_ctx; |
| |
| sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0; |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, "EAPOL-Key timeout"); |
| sm->TimeoutEvt = TRUE; |
| wpa_sm_step(sm); |
| } |
| |
| |
| void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int key_info, |
| const u8 *key_rsc, const u8 *nonce, |
| const u8 *kde, size_t kde_len, |
| int keyidx, int encr, int force_version) |
| { |
| struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr; |
| struct wpa_eapol_key *key; |
| size_t len; |
| int alg; |
| int key_data_len, pad_len = 0; |
| u8 *buf, *pos; |
| int version, pairwise; |
| int i; |
| |
| len = sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr) + sizeof(struct wpa_eapol_key); |
| |
| if (force_version) |
| version = force_version; |
| else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm)) |
| version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC; |
| else if (sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) |
| version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES; |
| else |
| version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4; |
| |
| pairwise = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d " |
| "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d " |
| "encr=%d)", |
| version, |
| (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE) ? 1 : 0, |
| (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC) ? 1 : 0, |
| (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK) ? 1 : 0, |
| (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL) ? 1 : 0, |
| pairwise, (unsigned long) kde_len, keyidx, encr); |
| |
| key_data_len = kde_len; |
| |
| if ((version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES || |
| version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) && encr) { |
| pad_len = key_data_len % 8; |
| if (pad_len) |
| pad_len = 8 - pad_len; |
| key_data_len += pad_len + 8; |
| } |
| |
| len += key_data_len; |
| |
| hdr = os_zalloc(len); |
| if (hdr == NULL) |
| return; |
| hdr->version = wpa_auth->conf.eapol_version; |
| hdr->type = IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY; |
| hdr->length = host_to_be16(len - sizeof(*hdr)); |
| key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1); |
| |
| key->type = sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ? |
| EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN : EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA; |
| key_info |= version; |
| if (encr && sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) |
| key_info |= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA; |
| if (sm->wpa != WPA_VERSION_WPA2) |
| key_info |= keyidx << WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT; |
| WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_info, key_info); |
| |
| alg = pairwise ? sm->pairwise : wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group; |
| WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg)); |
| if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE) |
| WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, 0); |
| |
| /* FIX: STSL: what to use as key_replay_counter? */ |
| for (i = RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES - 1; i > 0; i--) { |
| sm->key_replay[i].valid = sm->key_replay[i - 1].valid; |
| os_memcpy(sm->key_replay[i].counter, |
| sm->key_replay[i - 1].counter, |
| WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN); |
| } |
| inc_byte_array(sm->key_replay[0].counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN); |
| os_memcpy(key->replay_counter, sm->key_replay[0].counter, |
| WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN); |
| sm->key_replay[0].valid = TRUE; |
| |
| if (nonce) |
| os_memcpy(key->key_nonce, nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| |
| if (key_rsc) |
| os_memcpy(key->key_rsc, key_rsc, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN); |
| |
| if (kde && !encr) { |
| os_memcpy(key + 1, kde, kde_len); |
| WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_data_length, kde_len); |
| } else if (encr && kde) { |
| buf = os_zalloc(key_data_len); |
| if (buf == NULL) { |
| os_free(hdr); |
| return; |
| } |
| pos = buf; |
| os_memcpy(pos, kde, kde_len); |
| pos += kde_len; |
| |
| if (pad_len) |
| *pos++ = 0xdd; |
| |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data", |
| buf, key_data_len); |
| if (version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES || |
| version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) { |
| if (aes_wrap(sm->PTK.kek, (key_data_len - 8) / 8, buf, |
| (u8 *) (key + 1))) { |
| os_free(hdr); |
| os_free(buf); |
| return; |
| } |
| WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_data_length, key_data_len); |
| } else { |
| u8 ek[32]; |
| os_memcpy(key->key_iv, |
| sm->group->Counter + WPA_NONCE_LEN - 16, 16); |
| inc_byte_array(sm->group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| os_memcpy(ek, key->key_iv, 16); |
| os_memcpy(ek + 16, sm->PTK.kek, 16); |
| os_memcpy(key + 1, buf, key_data_len); |
| rc4_skip(ek, 32, 256, (u8 *) (key + 1), key_data_len); |
| WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_data_length, key_data_len); |
| } |
| os_free(buf); |
| } |
| |
| if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC) { |
| if (!sm->PTK_valid) { |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key " |
| "frame"); |
| os_free(hdr); |
| return; |
| } |
| wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->PTK.kck, version, (u8 *) hdr, len, |
| key->key_mic); |
| } |
| |
| wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx, |
| 1); |
| wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth, sm->addr, (u8 *) hdr, len, |
| sm->pairwise_set); |
| os_free(hdr); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int key_info, |
| const u8 *key_rsc, const u8 *nonce, |
| const u8 *kde, size_t kde_len, |
| int keyidx, int encr) |
| { |
| int timeout_ms; |
| int pairwise = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE; |
| int ctr; |
| |
| if (sm == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth, sm, key_info, key_rsc, nonce, kde, kde_len, |
| keyidx, encr, 0); |
| |
| ctr = pairwise ? sm->TimeoutCtr : sm->GTimeoutCtr; |
| if (ctr == 1 && wpa_auth->conf.tx_status) |
| timeout_ms = pairwise ? eapol_key_timeout_first : |
| eapol_key_timeout_first_group; |
| else |
| timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq; |
| if (pairwise && ctr == 1 && !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) |
| sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 1; |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry " |
| "counter %d)", timeout_ms, ctr); |
| eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms / 1000, (timeout_ms % 1000) * 1000, |
| wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk *PTK, u8 *data, size_t data_len) |
| { |
| struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr; |
| struct wpa_eapol_key *key; |
| u16 key_info; |
| int ret = 0; |
| u8 mic[16]; |
| |
| if (data_len < sizeof(*hdr) + sizeof(*key)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) data; |
| key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1); |
| key_info = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_info); |
| os_memcpy(mic, key->key_mic, 16); |
| os_memset(key->key_mic, 0, 16); |
| if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK->kck, key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK, |
| data, data_len, key->key_mic) || |
| os_memcmp(mic, key->key_mic, 16) != 0) |
| ret = -1; |
| os_memcpy(key->key_mic, mic, 16); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| |
| void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) |
| { |
| sm->PTK_valid = FALSE; |
| os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK)); |
| wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE, sm->addr, 0, NULL, 0); |
| sm->pairwise_set = FALSE; |
| eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm); |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, wpa_event event) |
| { |
| int remove_ptk = 1; |
| |
| if (sm == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| |
| wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "event %d notification", event); |
| |
| switch (event) { |
| case WPA_AUTH: |
| case WPA_ASSOC: |
| break; |
| case WPA_DEAUTH: |
| case WPA_DISASSOC: |
| sm->DeauthenticationRequest = TRUE; |
| break; |
| case WPA_REAUTH: |
| case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL: |
| if (!sm->started) { |
| /* |
| * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA |
| * manages to re-associate without the previous STA |
| * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make |
| * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized |
| * properly at this point. |
| */ |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA state machine had not been " |
| "started - initialize now"); |
| sm->started = 1; |
| sm->Init = TRUE; |
| if (wpa_sm_step(sm) == 1) |
| return 1; /* should not really happen */ |
| sm->Init = FALSE; |
| sm->AuthenticationRequest = TRUE; |
| break; |
| } |
| if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) { |
| /* |
| * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key |
| * update for this STA. |
| */ |
| sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--; |
| sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE; |
| sm->PtkGroupInit = TRUE; |
| } |
| sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = TRUE; |
| break; |
| case WPA_ASSOC_FT: |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Retry PTK configuration " |
| "after association"); |
| wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm); |
| |
| /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */ |
| sm->ft_completed = 1; |
| return 0; |
| #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| break; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| sm->ft_completed = 0; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W |
| if (sm->mgmt_frame_prot && event == WPA_AUTH) |
| remove_ptk = 0; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ |
| |
| if (remove_ptk) { |
| sm->PTK_valid = FALSE; |
| os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK)); |
| |
| if (event != WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL) |
| wpa_remove_ptk(sm); |
| } |
| |
| return wpa_sm_step(sm); |
| } |
| |
| |
| SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE) |
| { |
| SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE, wpa_ptk); |
| if (sm->Init) { |
| /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy |
| * loop by claiming nothing changed. */ |
| sm->changed = FALSE; |
| } |
| |
| sm->keycount = 0; |
| if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) |
| sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--; |
| sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE; |
| if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA) |
| sm->PInitAKeys = FALSE; |
| if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and |
| * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) { |
| sm->Pair = TRUE; |
| } |
| wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled, 0); |
| wpa_remove_ptk(sm); |
| wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portValid, 0); |
| sm->TimeoutCtr = 0; |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) { |
| wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, |
| WPA_EAPOL_authorized, 0); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT) |
| { |
| SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT, wpa_ptk); |
| sm->Disconnect = FALSE; |
| wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr); |
| } |
| |
| |
| SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED) |
| { |
| SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED, wpa_ptk); |
| sm->DeauthenticationRequest = FALSE; |
| } |
| |
| |
| SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION) |
| { |
| SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION, wpa_ptk); |
| os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK)); |
| sm->PTK_valid = FALSE; |
| wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto, |
| 1); |
| wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled, 1); |
| sm->AuthenticationRequest = FALSE; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_group *group) |
| { |
| if (group->first_sta_seen) |
| return; |
| /* |
| * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started |
| * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances |
| * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the |
| * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not |
| * enough entropy available immediately after system startup. |
| */ |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first " |
| "station"); |
| if (random_pool_ready() != 1) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool " |
| "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake"); |
| group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = TRUE; |
| } else { |
| group->first_sta_seen = TRUE; |
| group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = FALSE; |
| } |
| |
| wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group); |
| wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group); |
| wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group); |
| } |
| |
| |
| SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2) |
| { |
| SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2, wpa_ptk); |
| |
| wpa_group_ensure_init(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group); |
| |
| /* |
| * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat |
| * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is |
| * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security |
| * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces |
| * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state |
| * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide |
| * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks. |
| */ |
| if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: Failed to get random data for " |
| "ANonce."); |
| wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr); |
| return; |
| } |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm->ANonce, |
| WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = FALSE; |
| /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more |
| * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be |
| * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through |
| * INITIALIZE. */ |
| sm->TimeoutCtr = 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK) |
| { |
| u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN]; |
| size_t len = 2 * PMK_LEN; |
| |
| SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITPMK, wpa_ptk); |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| sm->xxkey_len = 0; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| if (sm->pmksa) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache"); |
| os_memcpy(sm->PMK, sm->pmksa->pmk, PMK_LEN); |
| } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, msk, &len) == 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine " |
| "(len=%lu)", (unsigned long) len); |
| os_memcpy(sm->PMK, msk, PMK_LEN); |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| if (len >= 2 * PMK_LEN) { |
| os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, msk + PMK_LEN, PMK_LEN); |
| sm->xxkey_len = PMK_LEN; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| } else { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Could not get PMK"); |
| } |
| |
| sm->req_replay_counter_used = 0; |
| /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this |
| * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be |
| * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state |
| * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK |
| * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will |
| * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK |
| * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to |
| * be good workaround for this issue. */ |
| wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun, 0); |
| } |
| |
| |
| SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPSK) |
| { |
| const u8 *psk; |
| SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITPSK, wpa_ptk); |
| psk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, NULL); |
| if (psk) { |
| os_memcpy(sm->PMK, psk, PMK_LEN); |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, psk, PMK_LEN); |
| sm->xxkey_len = PMK_LEN; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| } |
| sm->req_replay_counter_used = 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART) |
| { |
| u8 buf[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN], *pmkid = NULL; |
| size_t pmkid_len = 0; |
| |
| SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART, wpa_ptk); |
| sm->PTKRequest = FALSE; |
| sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE; |
| |
| sm->TimeoutCtr++; |
| if (sm->TimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) { |
| /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect |
| * immediately following this. */ |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake"); |
| /* |
| * TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only |
| * one possible PSK for this STA. |
| */ |
| if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 && |
| wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) { |
| pmkid = buf; |
| pmkid_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN; |
| pmkid[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC; |
| pmkid[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN; |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID); |
| if (sm->pmksa) |
| os_memcpy(&pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN], |
| sm->pmksa->pmkid, PMKID_LEN); |
| else { |
| /* |
| * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was |
| * available with pre-calculated PMKID. |
| */ |
| rsn_pmkid(sm->PMK, PMK_LEN, sm->wpa_auth->addr, |
| sm->addr, &pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN], |
| wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)); |
| } |
| } |
| wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm, |
| WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE, NULL, |
| sm->ANonce, pmkid, pmkid_len, 0, 0); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmk, |
| struct wpa_ptk *ptk) |
| { |
| size_t ptk_len = sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP ? 48 : 64; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) |
| return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm, pmk, ptk, ptk_len); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| |
| wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk, PMK_LEN, "Pairwise key expansion", |
| sm->wpa_auth->addr, sm->addr, sm->ANonce, sm->SNonce, |
| (u8 *) ptk, ptk_len, |
| wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING) |
| { |
| struct wpa_ptk PTK; |
| int ok = 0; |
| const u8 *pmk = NULL; |
| |
| SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk); |
| sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = FALSE; |
| sm->update_snonce = FALSE; |
| |
| /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP |
| * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching |
| * the packet */ |
| for (;;) { |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) { |
| pmk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, pmk); |
| if (pmk == NULL) |
| break; |
| } else |
| pmk = sm->PMK; |
| |
| wpa_derive_ptk(sm, pmk, &PTK); |
| |
| if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&PTK, sm->last_rx_eapol_key, |
| sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len) == 0) { |
| ok = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ok) { |
| wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake"); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 && wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) { |
| /* |
| * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches |
| * with the value we derived. |
| */ |
| if (os_memcmp(sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, sm->pmk_r1_name, |
| WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN) != 0) { |
| wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way " |
| "handshake"); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMKR1Name from " |
| "Supplicant", |
| sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name", |
| sm->pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN); |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| |
| sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0; |
| eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, sm->wpa_auth, sm); |
| |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) { |
| /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update |
| * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here. |
| */ |
| os_memcpy(sm->PMK, pmk, PMK_LEN); |
| } |
| |
| sm->MICVerified = TRUE; |
| |
| os_memcpy(&sm->PTK, &PTK, sizeof(PTK)); |
| sm->PTK_valid = TRUE; |
| } |
| |
| |
| SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2) |
| { |
| SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2, wpa_ptk); |
| sm->TimeoutCtr = 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W |
| |
| static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) |
| { |
| if (sm->mgmt_frame_prot) { |
| return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + sizeof(struct wpa_igtk_kde); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos) |
| { |
| struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk; |
| struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group; |
| |
| if (!sm->mgmt_frame_prot) |
| return pos; |
| |
| igtk.keyid[0] = gsm->GN_igtk; |
| igtk.keyid[1] = 0; |
| if (gsm->wpa_group_state != WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE || |
| wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_igtk, igtk.pn) < 0) |
| os_memset(igtk.pn, 0, sizeof(igtk.pn)); |
| os_memcpy(igtk.igtk, gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN); |
| if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_gtk) { |
| /* |
| * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of |
| * IGTK in the BSS. |
| */ |
| if (random_get_bytes(igtk.igtk, WPA_IGTK_LEN) < 0) |
| return pos; |
| } |
| pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK, |
| (const u8 *) &igtk, sizeof(igtk), NULL, 0); |
| |
| return pos; |
| } |
| |
| #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ |
| |
| static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) |
| { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos) |
| { |
| return pos; |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ |
| |
| |
| SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING) |
| { |
| u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN], *_rsc, *gtk, *kde, *pos, dummy_gtk[32]; |
| size_t gtk_len, kde_len; |
| struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group; |
| u8 *wpa_ie; |
| int wpa_ie_len, secure, keyidx, encr = 0; |
| |
| SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk); |
| sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE; |
| |
| sm->TimeoutCtr++; |
| if (sm->TimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) { |
| /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect |
| * immediately following this. */ |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE], |
| GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2]) |
| */ |
| os_memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN); |
| wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, rsc); |
| /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */ |
| wpa_ie = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie; |
| wpa_ie_len = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie_len; |
| if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA && |
| (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa & WPA_PROTO_RSN) && |
| wpa_ie_len > wpa_ie[1] + 2 && wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN) { |
| /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE */ |
| wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2; |
| wpa_ie_len = wpa_ie[1] + 2; |
| } |
| wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake"); |
| if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) { |
| /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */ |
| secure = 1; |
| gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1]; |
| gtk_len = gsm->GTK_len; |
| if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_gtk) { |
| /* |
| * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use |
| * of GTK in the BSS. |
| */ |
| if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk, gtk_len) < 0) |
| return; |
| gtk = dummy_gtk; |
| } |
| keyidx = gsm->GN; |
| _rsc = rsc; |
| encr = 1; |
| } else { |
| /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */ |
| secure = 0; |
| gtk = NULL; |
| gtk_len = 0; |
| keyidx = 0; |
| _rsc = NULL; |
| if (sm->rx_eapol_key_secure) { |
| /* |
| * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use |
| * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael |
| * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake |
| * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this |
| * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of |
| * WPA if the supplicant used it first. |
| */ |
| wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - " |
| "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround"); |
| secure = 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| kde_len = wpa_ie_len + ieee80211w_kde_len(sm); |
| if (gtk) |
| kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gtk_len; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) { |
| kde_len += 2 + PMKID_LEN; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */ |
| kde_len += 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */ |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| kde = os_malloc(kde_len); |
| if (kde == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| pos = kde; |
| os_memcpy(pos, wpa_ie, wpa_ie_len); |
| pos += wpa_ie_len; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) { |
| int res = wpa_insert_pmkid(kde, pos - kde, sm->pmk_r1_name); |
| if (res < 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT: Failed to insert " |
| "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data"); |
| os_free(kde); |
| return; |
| } |
| pos += res; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| if (gtk) { |
| u8 hdr[2]; |
| hdr[0] = keyidx & 0x03; |
| hdr[1] = 0; |
| pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2, |
| gtk, gtk_len); |
| } |
| pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos); |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) { |
| int res; |
| struct wpa_auth_config *conf; |
| |
| conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf; |
| res = wpa_write_ftie(conf, conf->r0_key_holder, |
| conf->r0_key_holder_len, |
| NULL, NULL, pos, kde + kde_len - pos, |
| NULL, 0); |
| if (res < 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE " |
| "into EAPOL-Key Key Data"); |
| os_free(kde); |
| return; |
| } |
| pos += res; |
| |
| /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */ |
| *pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL; |
| *pos++ = 5; |
| *pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE; |
| WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->reassociation_deadline); |
| pos += 4; |
| |
| /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */ |
| *pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL; |
| *pos++ = 5; |
| *pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME; |
| WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->r0_key_lifetime * 60); |
| pos += 4; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| |
| wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm, |
| (secure ? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE : 0) | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC | |
| WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL | |
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE, |
| _rsc, sm->ANonce, kde, pos - kde, keyidx, encr); |
| os_free(kde); |
| } |
| |
| |
| SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE) |
| { |
| SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE, wpa_ptk); |
| sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = FALSE; |
| if (sm->Pair) { |
| enum wpa_alg alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise); |
| int klen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise); |
| if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, alg, sm->addr, 0, |
| sm->PTK.tk1, klen)) { |
| wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr); |
| return; |
| } |
| /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */ |
| sm->pairwise_set = TRUE; |
| |
| if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_ptk_rekey) { |
| eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm); |
| eloop_register_timeout(sm->wpa_auth->conf. |
| wpa_ptk_rekey, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk, |
| sm->wpa_auth, sm); |
| } |
| |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) { |
| wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, |
| WPA_EAPOL_authorized, 1); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) { |
| sm->keycount++; |
| if (sm->keycount == 2) { |
| wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, |
| WPA_EAPOL_portValid, 1); |
| } |
| } else { |
| wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portValid, |
| 1); |
| } |
| wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable, 0); |
| wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone, 1); |
| if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA) |
| sm->PInitAKeys = TRUE; |
| else |
| sm->has_GTK = TRUE; |
| wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)", |
| sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA ? "WPA" : "RSN"); |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| } |
| |
| |
| SM_STEP(WPA_PTK) |
| { |
| struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth; |
| |
| if (sm->Init) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE); |
| else if (sm->Disconnect |
| /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) { |
| wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect"); |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT); |
| } |
| else if (sm->DeauthenticationRequest) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED); |
| else if (sm->AuthenticationRequest) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION); |
| else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2); |
| else if (sm->PTKRequest) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); |
| else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { |
| case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE: |
| break; |
| case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT: |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED); |
| break; |
| case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED: |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE); |
| break; |
| case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION: |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2); |
| break; |
| case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2: |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) && |
| wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, |
| WPA_EAPOL_keyRun) > 0) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITPMK); |
| else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) |
| /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITPSK); |
| break; |
| case WPA_PTK_INITPMK: |
| if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, |
| WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable) > 0) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); |
| else { |
| wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++; |
| wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false"); |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT); |
| } |
| break; |
| case WPA_PTK_INITPSK: |
| if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, NULL)) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); |
| else { |
| wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "no PSK configured for the STA"); |
| wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++; |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT); |
| } |
| break; |
| case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART: |
| if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest && |
| sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING); |
| else if (sm->TimeoutCtr > |
| (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) { |
| wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++; |
| wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "PTKSTART: Retry limit %d reached", |
| dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount); |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT); |
| } else if (sm->TimeoutEvt) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); |
| break; |
| case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING: |
| if (sm->MICVerified) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2); |
| else if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest && |
| sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING); |
| else if (sm->TimeoutEvt) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); |
| break; |
| case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2: |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING); |
| break; |
| case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING: |
| if (sm->update_snonce) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING); |
| else if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest && |
| sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE); |
| else if (sm->TimeoutCtr > |
| (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) { |
| wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++; |
| wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %d " |
| "reached", |
| dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount); |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT); |
| } else if (sm->TimeoutEvt) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING); |
| break; |
| case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE: |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE) |
| { |
| SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE, wpa_ptk_group); |
| if (sm->Init) { |
| /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy |
| * loop by claiming nothing changed. */ |
| sm->changed = FALSE; |
| } |
| sm->GTimeoutCtr = 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING) |
| { |
| u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN]; |
| struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group; |
| u8 *kde, *pos, hdr[2]; |
| size_t kde_len; |
| u8 *gtk, dummy_gtk[32]; |
| |
| SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk_group); |
| |
| sm->GTimeoutCtr++; |
| if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount) { |
| /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect |
| * immediately following this. */ |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA) |
| sm->PInitAKeys = FALSE; |
| sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE; |
| /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */ |
| os_memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN); |
| if (gsm->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE) |
| wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, rsc); |
| wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake"); |
| |
| gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1]; |
| if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_gtk) { |
| /* |
| * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use |
| * of GTK in the BSS. |
| */ |
| if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk, gsm->GTK_len) < 0) |
| return; |
| gtk = dummy_gtk; |
| } |
| if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) { |
| kde_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gsm->GTK_len + |
| ieee80211w_kde_len(sm); |
| kde = os_malloc(kde_len); |
| if (kde == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| pos = kde; |
| hdr[0] = gsm->GN & 0x03; |
| hdr[1] = 0; |
| pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2, |
| gtk, gsm->GTK_len); |
| pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos); |
| } else { |
| kde = gtk; |
| pos = kde + gsm->GTK_len; |
| } |
| |
| wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm, |
| WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC | |
| WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | |
| (!sm->Pair ? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL : 0), |
| rsc, gsm->GNonce, kde, pos - kde, gsm->GN, 1); |
| if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) |
| os_free(kde); |
| } |
| |
| |
| SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED) |
| { |
| SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED, wpa_ptk_group); |
| sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = FALSE; |
| if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) |
| sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--; |
| sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE; |
| sm->GTimeoutCtr = 0; |
| /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */ |
| wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO, |
| "group key handshake completed (%s)", |
| sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA ? "WPA" : "RSN"); |
| sm->has_GTK = TRUE; |
| } |
| |
| |
| SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR) |
| { |
| SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR, wpa_ptk_group); |
| if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) |
| sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--; |
| sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE; |
| sm->Disconnect = TRUE; |
| } |
| |
| |
| SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP) |
| { |
| if (sm->Init || sm->PtkGroupInit) { |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE); |
| sm->PtkGroupInit = FALSE; |
| } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_group_state) { |
| case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE: |
| if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys || |
| (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA && sm->PInitAKeys)) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING); |
| break; |
| case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING: |
| if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest && |
| !sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED); |
| else if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > |
| (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR); |
| else if (sm->TimeoutEvt) |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING); |
| break; |
| case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR: |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE); |
| break; |
| case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED: |
| SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_group *group) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| os_memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "Group key expansion", |
| wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce, |
| group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len) < 0) |
| ret = -1; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GTK", |
| group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len); |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W |
| if (wpa_auth->conf.ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION) { |
| os_memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "IGTK key expansion", |
| wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce, |
| group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], |
| WPA_IGTK_LEN) < 0) |
| ret = -1; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "IGTK", |
| group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN); |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_group *group) |
| { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state " |
| "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group->vlan_id); |
| group->changed = FALSE; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */ |
| group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT; |
| |
| /* GTK[0..N] = 0 */ |
| os_memset(group->GTK, 0, sizeof(group->GTK)); |
| group->GN = 1; |
| group->GM = 2; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W |
| group->GN_igtk = 4; |
| group->GM_igtk = 5; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ |
| /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */ |
| wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx) |
| { |
| if (ctx != NULL && ctx != sm->group) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE) { |
| wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update"); |
| sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) { |
| /* |
| * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry. |
| * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the |
| * station needs to be counted here anyway. |
| */ |
| wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, |
| "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when " |
| "marking station for GTK rekeying"); |
| } |
| |
| /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */ |
| if (sm->is_wnmsleep) |
| return 0; |
| |
| sm->group->GKeyDoneStations++; |
| sm->GUpdateStationKeys = TRUE; |
| |
| wpa_sm_step(sm); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_WNM |
| /* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */ |
| void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) |
| { |
| if (sm->is_wnmsleep) |
| return; |
| |
| wpa_group_update_sta(sm, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| |
| void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int flag) |
| { |
| sm->is_wnmsleep = !!flag; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos) |
| { |
| struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group; |
| u8 *start = pos; |
| |
| /* |
| * GTK subelement: |
| * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] | |
| * Key[5..32] |
| */ |
| *pos++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK; |
| *pos++ = 11 + gsm->GTK_len; |
| /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */ |
| WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, gsm->GN & 0x03); |
| pos += 2; |
| *pos++ = gsm->GTK_len; |
| if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, pos) != 0) |
| return 0; |
| pos += 8; |
| os_memcpy(pos, gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1], gsm->GTK_len); |
| pos += gsm->GTK_len; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit", |
| gsm->GN); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit", |
| gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1], gsm->GTK_len); |
| |
| return pos - start; |
| } |
| |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W |
| int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos) |
| { |
| struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group; |
| u8 *start = pos; |
| |
| /* |
| * IGTK subelement: |
| * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16] |
| */ |
| *pos++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK; |
| *pos++ = 2 + 6 + WPA_IGTK_LEN; |
| WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, gsm->GN_igtk); |
| pos += 2; |
| if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_igtk, pos) != 0) |
| return 0; |
| pos += 6; |
| |
| os_memcpy(pos, gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN); |
| pos += WPA_IGTK_LEN; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit", |
| gsm->GN_igtk); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit", |
| gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN); |
| |
| return pos - start; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ |
| #endif /* CONFIG_WNM */ |
| |
| |
| static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_group *group) |
| { |
| int tmp; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state " |
| "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group->vlan_id); |
| group->changed = TRUE; |
| group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS; |
| group->GTKReKey = FALSE; |
| tmp = group->GM; |
| group->GM = group->GN; |
| group->GN = tmp; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W |
| tmp = group->GM_igtk; |
| group->GM_igtk = group->GN_igtk; |
| group->GN_igtk = tmp; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ |
| /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by |
| * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of |
| * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */ |
| wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group); |
| |
| if (group->GKeyDoneStations) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected " |
| "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey", |
| group->GKeyDoneStations); |
| group->GKeyDoneStations = 0; |
| } |
| wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_group_update_sta, group); |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d", |
| group->GKeyDoneStations); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_group *group) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth, group->vlan_id, |
| wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group), |
| broadcast_ether_addr, group->GN, |
| group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len) < 0) |
| ret = -1; |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W |
| if (wpa_auth->conf.ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION && |
| wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth, group->vlan_id, WPA_ALG_IGTK, |
| broadcast_ether_addr, group->GN_igtk, |
| group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], |
| WPA_IGTK_LEN) < 0) |
| ret = -1; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_group *group) |
| { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state " |
| "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group->vlan_id); |
| group->changed = TRUE; |
| group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE; |
| |
| if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_group *group) |
| { |
| if (group->GInit) { |
| wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth, group); |
| } else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT && |
| group->GTKAuthenticator) { |
| wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth, group); |
| } else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE && |
| group->GTKReKey) { |
| wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth, group); |
| } else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS) { |
| if (group->GKeyDoneStations == 0) |
| wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth, group); |
| else if (group->GTKReKey) |
| wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth, group); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) |
| { |
| if (sm == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (sm->in_step_loop) { |
| /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not |
| * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the |
| * recursive call. */ |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| sm->in_step_loop = 1; |
| do { |
| if (sm->pending_deinit) |
| break; |
| |
| sm->changed = FALSE; |
| sm->wpa_auth->group->changed = FALSE; |
| |
| SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK); |
| if (sm->pending_deinit) |
| break; |
| SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP); |
| if (sm->pending_deinit) |
| break; |
| wpa_group_sm_step(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group); |
| } while (sm->changed || sm->wpa_auth->group->changed); |
| sm->in_step_loop = 0; |
| |
| if (sm->pending_deinit) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Completing pending STA state " |
| "machine deinit for " MACSTR, MAC2STR(sm->addr)); |
| wpa_free_sta_sm(sm); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx) |
| { |
| struct wpa_state_machine *sm = eloop_ctx; |
| wpa_sm_step(sm); |
| } |
| |
| |
| void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) |
| { |
| if (sm == NULL) |
| return; |
| eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step, sm, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| |
| void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth) |
| { |
| int tmp, i; |
| struct wpa_group *group; |
| |
| if (wpa_auth == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| group = wpa_auth->group; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { |
| tmp = group->GM; |
| group->GM = group->GN; |
| group->GN = tmp; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W |
| tmp = group->GM_igtk; |
| group->GM_igtk = group->GN_igtk; |
| group->GN_igtk = tmp; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ |
| wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group); |
| wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int bool) |
| { |
| return bool ? "TRUE" : "FALSE"; |
| } |
| |
| |
| #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d" |
| #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \ |
| ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff |
| |
| int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, char *buf, size_t buflen) |
| { |
| int len = 0, ret; |
| char pmkid_txt[PMKID_LEN * 2 + 1]; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH |
| const int preauth = 1; |
| #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */ |
| const int preauth = 0; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */ |
| |
| if (wpa_auth == NULL) |
| return len; |
| |
| ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len, |
| "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n" |
| "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n" |
| "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n" |
| "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n", |
| wpa_bool_txt(preauth), |
| wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth->conf.wpa & WPA_PROTO_RSN), |
| wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth->conf.rsn_preauth)); |
| if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len) |
| return len; |
| len += ret; |
| |
| wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt, sizeof(pmkid_txt), |
| wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed, PMKID_LEN); |
| |
| ret = os_snprintf( |
| buf + len, buflen - len, |
| "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n" |
| "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n" |
| /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */ |
| /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */ |
| /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */ |
| /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */ |
| "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n" |
| "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n" |
| "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n" |
| "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n" |
| "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n" |
| "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n" |
| "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n" |
| "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n" |
| "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n" |
| "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n" |
| "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n" |
| "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n" |
| "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n" |
| "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n" |
| "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n" |
| "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n" |
| "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n" |
| "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n", |
| RSN_VERSION, |
| !!wpa_auth->conf.wpa_strict_rekey, |
| dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount, |
| dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount, |
| wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group) * 8, |
| dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime, |
| dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold, |
| dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout, |
| RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected), |
| RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected), |
| RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected), |
| pmkid_txt, |
| RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested), |
| RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested), |
| RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested), |
| wpa_auth->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked, |
| wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures); |
| if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len) |
| return len; |
| len += ret; |
| |
| /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */ |
| /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */ |
| |
| /* Private MIB */ |
| ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n", |
| wpa_auth->group->wpa_group_state); |
| if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len) |
| return len; |
| len += ret; |
| |
| return len; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, char *buf, size_t buflen) |
| { |
| int len = 0, ret; |
| u32 pairwise = 0; |
| |
| if (sm == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */ |
| |
| /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */ |
| |
| pairwise = wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ? |
| WPA_PROTO_RSN : WPA_PROTO_WPA, |
| sm->pairwise); |
| if (pairwise == 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| ret = os_snprintf( |
| buf + len, buflen - len, |
| /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */ |
| "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR "\n" |
| "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n" |
| "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE "\n" |
| /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */ |
| "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n" |
| "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n" |
| /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */ |
| /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */ |
| /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */, |
| MAC2STR(sm->addr), |
| RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise), |
| sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures, |
| sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures); |
| if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len) |
| return len; |
| len += ret; |
| |
| /* Private MIB */ |
| ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len, |
| "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n" |
| "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n", |
| sm->wpa_ptk_state, |
| sm->wpa_ptk_group_state); |
| if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len) |
| return len; |
| len += ret; |
| |
| return len; |
| } |
| |
| |
| void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth) |
| { |
| if (wpa_auth) |
| wpa_auth->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked++; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) |
| { |
| return sm && sm->pairwise_set; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) |
| { |
| return sm->pairwise; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) |
| { |
| if (sm == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| return sm->wpa_key_mgmt; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) |
| { |
| if (sm == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| return sm->wpa; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, |
| struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry) |
| { |
| if (sm == NULL || sm->pmksa != entry) |
| return -1; |
| sm->pmksa = NULL; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry * |
| wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) |
| { |
| return sm ? sm->pmksa : NULL; |
| } |
| |
| |
| void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) |
| { |
| if (sm) |
| sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures++; |
| } |
| |
| |
| const u8 * wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, size_t *len) |
| { |
| if (wpa_auth == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| *len = wpa_auth->wpa_ie_len; |
| return wpa_auth->wpa_ie; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmk, |
| int session_timeout, struct eapol_state_machine *eapol) |
| { |
| if (sm == NULL || sm->wpa != WPA_VERSION_WPA2 || |
| sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_pmksa_caching) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm->wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, PMK_LEN, |
| sm->wpa_auth->addr, sm->addr, session_timeout, |
| eapol, sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| const u8 *pmk, size_t len, const u8 *sta_addr, |
| int session_timeout, |
| struct eapol_state_machine *eapol) |
| { |
| if (wpa_auth == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, len, wpa_auth->addr, |
| sta_addr, session_timeout, eapol, |
| WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static struct wpa_group * |
| wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, int vlan_id) |
| { |
| struct wpa_group *group; |
| |
| if (wpa_auth == NULL || wpa_auth->group == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d", |
| vlan_id); |
| group = wpa_group_init(wpa_auth, vlan_id, 0); |
| if (group == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| group->next = wpa_auth->group->next; |
| wpa_auth->group->next = group; |
| |
| return group; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int vlan_id) |
| { |
| struct wpa_group *group; |
| |
| if (sm == NULL || sm->wpa_auth == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| group = sm->wpa_auth->group; |
| while (group) { |
| if (group->vlan_id == vlan_id) |
| break; |
| group = group->next; |
| } |
| |
| if (group == NULL) { |
| group = wpa_auth_add_group(sm->wpa_auth, vlan_id); |
| if (group == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (sm->group == group) |
| return 0; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR " to use group state " |
| "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm->addr), vlan_id); |
| |
| sm->group = group; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, |
| struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int ack) |
| { |
| if (wpa_auth == NULL || sm == NULL) |
| return; |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR |
|