| /* |
| * General front end for stream and datagram IP services. This program logs |
| * the remote host name and then invokes the real daemon. For example, |
| * install as /usr/etc/{tftpd,fingerd,telnetd,ftpd,rlogind,rshd,rexecd}, |
| * after saving the real daemons in the directory specified with the |
| * REAL_DAEMON_DIR macro. This arrangement requires that the network daemons |
| * are started by inetd or something similar. Connections and diagnostics |
| * are logged through syslog(3). |
| * |
| * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. |
| */ |
| |
| #ifndef lint |
| static char sccsid[] = "@(#) tcpd.c 1.10 96/02/11 17:01:32"; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* System libraries. */ |
| |
| #include <sys/types.h> |
| #include <sys/param.h> |
| #include <sys/stat.h> |
| #include <sys/socket.h> |
| #include <netinet/in.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <syslog.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #ifndef MAXPATHNAMELEN |
| #define MAXPATHNAMELEN BUFSIZ |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef STDIN_FILENO |
| #define STDIN_FILENO 0 |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Local stuff. */ |
| |
| #include "patchlevel.h" |
| #include "tcpd.h" |
| |
| int allow_severity = SEVERITY; /* run-time adjustable */ |
| int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; /* ditto */ |
| |
| main(argc, argv) |
| int argc; |
| char **argv; |
| { |
| struct request_info request; |
| char path[MAXPATHNAMELEN]; |
| |
| /* Attempt to prevent the creation of world-writable files. */ |
| |
| #ifdef DAEMON_UMASK |
| umask(DAEMON_UMASK); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * If argv[0] is an absolute path name, ignore REAL_DAEMON_DIR, and strip |
| * argv[0] to its basename. |
| */ |
| |
| if (argv[0][0] == '/') { |
| strncpy(path, argv[0], sizeof(path)); |
| argv[0] = strrchr(argv[0], '/') + 1; |
| } else { |
| snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", REAL_DAEMON_DIR, argv[0]); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Open a channel to the syslog daemon. Older versions of openlog() |
| * require only two arguments. |
| */ |
| |
| #ifdef LOG_MAIL |
| (void) openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID, FACILITY); |
| #else |
| (void) openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Find out the endpoint addresses of this conversation. Host name |
| * lookups and double checks will be done on demand. |
| */ |
| |
| request_init(&request, RQ_DAEMON, argv[0], RQ_FILE, STDIN_FILENO, 0); |
| fromhost(&request); |
| |
| /* |
| * Optionally look up and double check the remote host name. Sites |
| * concerned with security may choose to refuse connections from hosts |
| * that pretend to have someone elses host name. |
| */ |
| |
| #ifdef PARANOID |
| if (STR_EQ(eval_hostname(request.client), paranoid)) |
| refuse(&request); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * The BSD rlogin and rsh daemons that came out after 4.3 BSD disallow |
| * socket options at the IP level. They do so for a good reason. |
| * Unfortunately, we cannot use this with SunOS 4.1.x because the |
| * getsockopt() system call can panic the system. |
| */ |
| |
| #ifdef KILL_IP_OPTIONS |
| fix_options(&request); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Check whether this host can access the service in argv[0]. The |
| * access-control code invokes optional shell commands as specified in |
| * the access-control tables. |
| */ |
| |
| #ifdef HOSTS_ACCESS |
| if (!hosts_access(&request)) |
| refuse(&request); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Report request and invoke the real daemon program. */ |
| |
| #ifdef INET6 |
| syslog(allow_severity, "connect from %s (%s)", |
| eval_client(&request), eval_hostaddr(request.client)); |
| #else |
| syslog(allow_severity, "connect from %s", eval_client(&request)); |
| #endif |
| closelog(); |
| (void) execv(path, argv); |
| syslog(LOG_ERR, "error: cannot execute %s: %m", path); |
| clean_exit(&request); |
| /* NOTREACHED */ |
| } |