blob: 5b1421ba8677840f63d1795e25d57d29f7f0d6c4 [file] [log] [blame]
/*
* LUKS - Linux Unified Key Setup
*
* Copyright (C) 2004-2006, Clemens Fruhwirth <clemens@endorphin.org>
* Copyright (C) 2009-2017, Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (C) 2013-2017, Milan Broz
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
* of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <uuid/uuid.h>
#include "luks.h"
#include "af.h"
#include "internal.h"
/* Get size of struct luks_phdr with all keyslots material space */
static size_t LUKS_device_sectors(size_t keyLen)
{
size_t keyslot_sectors, sector;
int i;
keyslot_sectors = AF_split_sectors(keyLen, LUKS_STRIPES);
sector = LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE;
for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
sector = size_round_up(sector, LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE);
sector += keyslot_sectors;
}
return sector;
}
int LUKS_keyslot_area(const struct luks_phdr *hdr,
int keyslot,
uint64_t *offset,
uint64_t *length)
{
if(keyslot >= LUKS_NUMKEYS || keyslot < 0)
return -EINVAL;
*offset = (uint64_t)hdr->keyblock[keyslot].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE;
*length = AF_split_sectors(hdr->keyBytes, LUKS_STRIPES) * SECTOR_SIZE;
return 0;
}
static int LUKS_check_device_size(struct crypt_device *ctx, size_t keyLength)
{
struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
uint64_t dev_sectors, hdr_sectors;
if (!keyLength)
return -EINVAL;
if(device_size(device, &dev_sectors)) {
log_dbg("Cannot get device size for device %s.", device_path(device));
return -EIO;
}
dev_sectors >>= SECTOR_SHIFT;
hdr_sectors = LUKS_device_sectors(keyLength);
log_dbg("Key length %zu, device size %" PRIu64 " sectors, header size %"
PRIu64 " sectors.",keyLength, dev_sectors, hdr_sectors);
if (hdr_sectors > dev_sectors) {
log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is too small. (LUKS requires at least %" PRIu64 " bytes.)\n"),
device_path(device), hdr_sectors * SECTOR_SIZE);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
/* Check keyslot to prevent access outside of header and keyslot area */
static int LUKS_check_keyslot_size(const struct luks_phdr *phdr, unsigned int keyIndex)
{
uint32_t secs_per_stripes;
/* First sectors is the header itself */
if (phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE < sizeof(*phdr)) {
log_dbg("Invalid offset %u in keyslot %u.",
phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset, keyIndex);
return 1;
}
/* Ignore following check for detached header where offset can be zero. */
if (phdr->payloadOffset == 0)
return 0;
if (phdr->payloadOffset <= phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset) {
log_dbg("Invalid offset %u in keyslot %u (beyond data area offset %u).",
phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset, keyIndex,
phdr->payloadOffset);
return 1;
}
secs_per_stripes = AF_split_sectors(phdr->keyBytes, phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes);
if (phdr->payloadOffset < (phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset + secs_per_stripes)) {
log_dbg("Invalid keyslot size %u (offset %u, stripes %u) in "
"keyslot %u (beyond data area offset %u).",
secs_per_stripes,
phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset,
phdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes,
keyIndex, phdr->payloadOffset);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static const char *dbg_slot_state(crypt_keyslot_info ki)
{
switch(ki) {
case CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE:
return "INACTIVE";
case CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE:
return "ACTIVE";
case CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST:
return "ACTIVE_LAST";
case CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID:
default:
return "INVALID";
}
}
int LUKS_hdr_backup(const char *backup_file, struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
struct luks_phdr hdr;
int r = 0, devfd = -1;
ssize_t hdr_size;
ssize_t buffer_size;
char *buffer = NULL;
r = LUKS_read_phdr(&hdr, 1, 0, ctx);
if (r)
return r;
hdr_size = LUKS_device_sectors(hdr.keyBytes) << SECTOR_SHIFT;
buffer_size = size_round_up(hdr_size, crypt_getpagesize());
buffer = crypt_safe_alloc(buffer_size);
if (!buffer || hdr_size < LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS || hdr_size > buffer_size) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
log_dbg("Storing backup of header (%zu bytes) and keyslot area (%zu bytes).",
sizeof(hdr), hdr_size - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS);
log_dbg("Output backup file size: %zu bytes.", buffer_size);
devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY);
if (devfd < 0) {
log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device.\n"), device_path(device));
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (read_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), buffer, hdr_size) < hdr_size) {
r = -EIO;
goto out;
}
close(devfd);
/* Wipe unused area, so backup cannot contain old signatures */
if (hdr.keyblock[0].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE == LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS)
memset(buffer + sizeof(hdr), 0, LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS - sizeof(hdr));
devfd = open(backup_file, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR);
if (devfd == -1) {
if (errno == EEXIST)
log_err(ctx, _("Requested header backup file %s already exists.\n"), backup_file);
else
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot create header backup file %s.\n"), backup_file);
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (write_buffer(devfd, buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write header backup file %s.\n"), backup_file);
r = -EIO;
goto out;
}
r = 0;
out:
if (devfd >= 0)
close(devfd);
crypt_memzero(&hdr, sizeof(hdr));
crypt_safe_free(buffer);
return r;
}
int LUKS_hdr_restore(
const char *backup_file,
struct luks_phdr *hdr,
struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
int r = 0, devfd = -1, diff_uuid = 0;
ssize_t buffer_size = 0;
char *buffer = NULL, msg[200];
struct luks_phdr hdr_file;
r = LUKS_read_phdr_backup(backup_file, &hdr_file, 0, ctx);
if (r == -ENOENT)
return r;
if (!r)
buffer_size = LUKS_device_sectors(hdr_file.keyBytes) << SECTOR_SHIFT;
if (r || buffer_size < LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS) {
log_err(ctx, _("Backup file doesn't contain valid LUKS header.\n"));
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
buffer = crypt_safe_alloc(buffer_size);
if (!buffer) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
devfd = open(backup_file, O_RDONLY);
if (devfd == -1) {
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open header backup file %s.\n"), backup_file);
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (read_buffer(devfd, buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot read header backup file %s.\n"), backup_file);
r = -EIO;
goto out;
}
close(devfd);
devfd = -1;
r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 0, 0, ctx);
if (r == 0) {
log_dbg("Device %s already contains LUKS header, checking UUID and offset.", device_path(device));
if(hdr->payloadOffset != hdr_file.payloadOffset ||
hdr->keyBytes != hdr_file.keyBytes) {
log_err(ctx, _("Data offset or key size differs on device and backup, restore failed.\n"));
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (memcmp(hdr->uuid, hdr_file.uuid, UUID_STRING_L))
diff_uuid = 1;
}
if (snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), _("Device %s %s%s"), device_path(device),
r ? _("does not contain LUKS header. Replacing header can destroy data on that device.") :
_("already contains LUKS header. Replacing header will destroy existing keyslots."),
diff_uuid ? _("\nWARNING: real device header has different UUID than backup!") : "") < 0) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (!crypt_confirm(ctx, msg)) {
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
log_dbg("Storing backup of header (%zu bytes) and keyslot area (%zu bytes) to device %s.",
sizeof(*hdr), buffer_size - LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS, device_path(device));
devfd = device_open(device, O_RDWR);
if (devfd < 0) {
if (errno == EACCES)
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied.\n"),
device_path(device));
else
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open device %s.\n"), device_path(device));
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (write_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), buffer, buffer_size) < buffer_size) {
r = -EIO;
goto out;
}
close(devfd);
devfd = -1;
/* Be sure to reload new data */
r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 1, 0, ctx);
out:
if (devfd >= 0)
close(devfd);
crypt_safe_free(buffer);
return r;
}
/* This routine should do some just basic recovery for known problems. */
static int _keyslot_repair(struct luks_phdr *phdr, struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
struct luks_phdr temp_phdr;
const unsigned char *sector = (const unsigned char*)phdr;
struct volume_key *vk;
uint64_t PBKDF2_per_sec = 1;
int i, bad, r, need_write = 0;
if (phdr->keyBytes != 16 && phdr->keyBytes != 32 && phdr->keyBytes != 64) {
log_err(ctx, _("Non standard key size, manual repair required.\n"));
return -EINVAL;
}
/* cryptsetup 1.0 did not align to 4k, cannot repair this one */
if (phdr->keyblock[0].keyMaterialOffset < (LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE)) {
log_err(ctx, _("Non standard keyslots alignment, manual repair required.\n"));
return -EINVAL;
}
vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(phdr->keyBytes, NULL);
log_verbose(ctx, _("Repairing keyslots.\n"));
log_dbg("Generating second header with the same parameters for check.");
/* cipherName, cipherMode, hashSpec, uuid are already null terminated */
/* payloadOffset - cannot check */
r = LUKS_generate_phdr(&temp_phdr, vk, phdr->cipherName, phdr->cipherMode,
phdr->hashSpec,phdr->uuid, LUKS_STRIPES,
phdr->payloadOffset, 0,
1, &PBKDF2_per_sec,
1, ctx);
if (r < 0) {
log_err(ctx, _("Repair failed."));
goto out;
}
for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; ++i) {
if (phdr->keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_ENABLED) {
log_dbg("Skipping repair for active keyslot %i.", i);
continue;
}
bad = 0;
if (phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset != temp_phdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset) {
log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: offset repaired (%u -> %u).\n"), i,
(unsigned)phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset,
(unsigned)temp_phdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset);
phdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset = temp_phdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset;
bad = 1;
}
if (phdr->keyblock[i].stripes != temp_phdr.keyblock[i].stripes) {
log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: stripes repaired (%u -> %u).\n"), i,
(unsigned)phdr->keyblock[i].stripes,
(unsigned)temp_phdr.keyblock[i].stripes);
phdr->keyblock[i].stripes = temp_phdr.keyblock[i].stripes;
bad = 1;
}
/* Known case - MSDOS partition table signature */
if (i == 6 && sector[0x1fe] == 0x55 && sector[0x1ff] == 0xaa) {
log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: bogus partition signature.\n"), i);
bad = 1;
}
if(bad) {
log_err(ctx, _("Keyslot %i: salt wiped.\n"), i);
phdr->keyblock[i].active = LUKS_KEY_DISABLED;
memset(&phdr->keyblock[i].passwordSalt, 0x00, LUKS_SALTSIZE);
phdr->keyblock[i].passwordIterations = 0;
}
if (bad)
need_write = 1;
}
if (need_write) {
log_verbose(ctx, _("Writing LUKS header to disk.\n"));
r = LUKS_write_phdr(phdr, ctx);
}
out:
crypt_free_volume_key(vk);
crypt_memzero(&temp_phdr, sizeof(temp_phdr));
return r;
}
static int _check_and_convert_hdr(const char *device,
struct luks_phdr *hdr,
int require_luks_device,
int repair,
struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
int r = 0;
unsigned int i;
char luksMagic[] = LUKS_MAGIC;
if(memcmp(hdr->magic, luksMagic, LUKS_MAGIC_L)) { /* Check magic */
log_dbg("LUKS header not detected.");
if (require_luks_device)
log_err(ctx, _("Device %s is not a valid LUKS device.\n"), device);
return -EINVAL;
} else if((hdr->version = ntohs(hdr->version)) != 1) { /* Convert every uint16/32_t item from network byte order */
log_err(ctx, _("Unsupported LUKS version %d.\n"), hdr->version);
return -EINVAL;
}
hdr->hashSpec[LUKS_HASHSPEC_L - 1] = '\0';
if (crypt_hmac_size(hdr->hashSpec) < LUKS_DIGESTSIZE) {
log_err(ctx, _("Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported.\n"), hdr->hashSpec);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Header detected */
hdr->payloadOffset = ntohl(hdr->payloadOffset);
hdr->keyBytes = ntohl(hdr->keyBytes);
hdr->mkDigestIterations = ntohl(hdr->mkDigestIterations);
for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; ++i) {
hdr->keyblock[i].active = ntohl(hdr->keyblock[i].active);
hdr->keyblock[i].passwordIterations = ntohl(hdr->keyblock[i].passwordIterations);
hdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset = ntohl(hdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset);
hdr->keyblock[i].stripes = ntohl(hdr->keyblock[i].stripes);
if (LUKS_check_keyslot_size(hdr, i)) {
log_err(ctx, _("LUKS keyslot %u is invalid.\n"), i);
r = -EINVAL;
}
}
/* Avoid unterminated strings */
hdr->cipherName[LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L - 1] = '\0';
hdr->cipherMode[LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L - 1] = '\0';
hdr->uuid[UUID_STRING_L - 1] = '\0';
if (repair) {
if (r == -EINVAL)
r = _keyslot_repair(hdr, ctx);
else
log_verbose(ctx, _("No known problems detected for LUKS header.\n"));
}
return r;
}
static void _to_lower(char *str, unsigned max_len)
{
for(; *str && max_len; str++, max_len--)
if (isupper(*str))
*str = tolower(*str);
}
static void LUKS_fix_header_compatible(struct luks_phdr *header)
{
/* Old cryptsetup expects "sha1", gcrypt allows case insensistive names,
* so always convert hash to lower case in header */
_to_lower(header->hashSpec, LUKS_HASHSPEC_L);
/* ECB mode does not use IV but dmcrypt silently allows it.
* Drop any IV here if ECB is used (that is not secure anyway).*/
if (!strncmp(header->cipherMode, "ecb-", 4)) {
memset(header->cipherMode, 0, LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L);
strcpy(header->cipherMode, "ecb");
}
}
int LUKS_read_phdr_backup(const char *backup_file,
struct luks_phdr *hdr,
int require_luks_device,
struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct luks_phdr);
int devfd = 0, r = 0;
log_dbg("Reading LUKS header of size %d from backup file %s",
(int)hdr_size, backup_file);
devfd = open(backup_file, O_RDONLY);
if (devfd == -1) {
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open header backup file %s.\n"), backup_file);
return -ENOENT;
}
if (read_buffer(devfd, hdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size)
r = -EIO;
else {
LUKS_fix_header_compatible(hdr);
r = _check_and_convert_hdr(backup_file, hdr,
require_luks_device, 0, ctx);
}
close(devfd);
return r;
}
int LUKS_read_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
int require_luks_device,
int repair,
struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct luks_phdr);
int devfd = 0, r = 0;
/* LUKS header starts at offset 0, first keyslot on LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS */
assert(sizeof(struct luks_phdr) <= LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS);
/* Stripes count cannot be changed without additional code fixes yet */
assert(LUKS_STRIPES == 4000);
if (repair && !require_luks_device)
return -EINVAL;
log_dbg("Reading LUKS header of size %zu from device %s",
hdr_size, device_path(device));
devfd = device_open(device, O_RDONLY);
if (devfd < 0) {
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open device %s.\n"), device_path(device));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (read_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), hdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size)
r = -EIO;
else
r = _check_and_convert_hdr(device_path(device), hdr, require_luks_device,
repair, ctx);
if (!r)
r = LUKS_check_device_size(ctx, hdr->keyBytes);
/*
* Cryptsetup 1.0.0 did not align keyslots to 4k (very rare version).
* Disable direct-io to avoid possible IO errors if underlying device
* has bigger sector size.
*/
if (!r && hdr->keyblock[0].keyMaterialOffset * SECTOR_SIZE < LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS) {
log_dbg("Old unaligned LUKS keyslot detected, disabling direct-io.");
device_disable_direct_io(device);
}
close(devfd);
return r;
}
int LUKS_write_phdr(struct luks_phdr *hdr,
struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
ssize_t hdr_size = sizeof(struct luks_phdr);
int devfd = 0;
unsigned int i;
struct luks_phdr convHdr;
int r;
log_dbg("Updating LUKS header of size %zu on device %s",
sizeof(struct luks_phdr), device_path(device));
r = LUKS_check_device_size(ctx, hdr->keyBytes);
if (r)
return r;
devfd = device_open(device, O_RDWR);
if (devfd < 0) {
if (errno == EACCES)
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied.\n"),
device_path(device));
else
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot open device %s.\n"), device_path(device));
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(&convHdr, hdr, hdr_size);
memset(&convHdr._padding, 0, sizeof(convHdr._padding));
/* Convert every uint16/32_t item to network byte order */
convHdr.version = htons(hdr->version);
convHdr.payloadOffset = htonl(hdr->payloadOffset);
convHdr.keyBytes = htonl(hdr->keyBytes);
convHdr.mkDigestIterations = htonl(hdr->mkDigestIterations);
for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; ++i) {
convHdr.keyblock[i].active = htonl(hdr->keyblock[i].active);
convHdr.keyblock[i].passwordIterations = htonl(hdr->keyblock[i].passwordIterations);
convHdr.keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset = htonl(hdr->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset);
convHdr.keyblock[i].stripes = htonl(hdr->keyblock[i].stripes);
}
r = write_blockwise(devfd, device_block_size(device), &convHdr, hdr_size) < hdr_size ? -EIO : 0;
if (r)
log_err(ctx, _("Error during update of LUKS header on device %s.\n"), device_path(device));
close(devfd);
/* Re-read header from disk to be sure that in-memory and on-disk data are the same. */
if (!r) {
r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 1, 0, ctx);
if (r)
log_err(ctx, _("Error re-reading LUKS header after update on device %s.\n"),
device_path(device));
}
return r;
}
/* Check that kernel supports requested cipher by decryption of one sector */
static int LUKS_check_cipher(struct luks_phdr *hdr, struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
int r;
struct volume_key *empty_key;
char buf[SECTOR_SIZE];
log_dbg("Checking if cipher %s-%s is usable.", hdr->cipherName, hdr->cipherMode);
empty_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(hdr->keyBytes, NULL);
if (!empty_key)
return -ENOMEM;
/* No need to get KEY quality random but it must avoid known weak keys. */
r = crypt_random_get(ctx, empty_key->key, empty_key->keylength, CRYPT_RND_NORMAL);
if (!r)
r = LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(buf, sizeof(buf), hdr->cipherName,
hdr->cipherMode, empty_key, 0, ctx);
crypt_free_volume_key(empty_key);
crypt_memzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
return r;
}
int LUKS_generate_phdr(struct luks_phdr *header,
const struct volume_key *vk,
const char *cipherName, const char *cipherMode, const char *hashSpec,
const char *uuid, unsigned int stripes,
unsigned int alignPayload,
unsigned int alignOffset,
uint32_t iteration_time_ms,
uint64_t *PBKDF2_per_sec,
int detached_metadata_device,
struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
unsigned int i = 0, hdr_sectors = LUKS_device_sectors(vk->keylength);
size_t blocksPerStripeSet, currentSector;
int r;
uuid_t partitionUuid;
char luksMagic[] = LUKS_MAGIC;
/* For separate metadata device allow zero alignment */
if (alignPayload == 0 && !detached_metadata_device)
alignPayload = DEFAULT_DISK_ALIGNMENT / SECTOR_SIZE;
if (alignPayload && detached_metadata_device && alignPayload < hdr_sectors) {
log_err(ctx, _("Data offset for detached LUKS header must be "
"either 0 or higher than header size (%d sectors).\n"),
hdr_sectors);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (crypt_hmac_size(hashSpec) < LUKS_DIGESTSIZE) {
log_err(ctx, _("Requested LUKS hash %s is not supported.\n"), hashSpec);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (uuid && uuid_parse(uuid, partitionUuid) == -1) {
log_err(ctx, _("Wrong LUKS UUID format provided.\n"));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!uuid)
uuid_generate(partitionUuid);
memset(header,0,sizeof(struct luks_phdr));
/* Set Magic */
memcpy(header->magic,luksMagic,LUKS_MAGIC_L);
header->version=1;
strncpy(header->cipherName,cipherName,LUKS_CIPHERNAME_L-1);
strncpy(header->cipherMode,cipherMode,LUKS_CIPHERMODE_L-1);
strncpy(header->hashSpec,hashSpec,LUKS_HASHSPEC_L-1);
header->keyBytes=vk->keylength;
LUKS_fix_header_compatible(header);
r = LUKS_check_cipher(header, ctx);
if (r < 0)
return r;
log_dbg("Generating LUKS header version %d using hash %s, %s, %s, MK %d bytes",
header->version, header->hashSpec ,header->cipherName, header->cipherMode,
header->keyBytes);
r = crypt_random_get(ctx, header->mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
if(r < 0) {
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot create LUKS header: reading random salt failed.\n"));
return r;
}
r = crypt_benchmark_kdf(ctx, "pbkdf2", header->hashSpec,
"foo", 3, "bar", 3, PBKDF2_per_sec);
if (r < 0) {
log_err(ctx, _("Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s).\n"),
header->hashSpec);
return r;
}
/* Compute master key digest */
iteration_time_ms /= 8;
header->mkDigestIterations = at_least((uint32_t)(*PBKDF2_per_sec/1024) * iteration_time_ms,
LUKS_MKD_ITERATIONS_MIN);
r = crypt_pbkdf("pbkdf2", header->hashSpec, vk->key,vk->keylength,
header->mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
header->mkDigest,LUKS_DIGESTSIZE,
header->mkDigestIterations);
if(r < 0) {
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot create LUKS header: header digest failed (using hash %s).\n"),
header->hashSpec);
return r;
}
currentSector = LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE;
blocksPerStripeSet = AF_split_sectors(vk->keylength, stripes);
for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; ++i) {
header->keyblock[i].active = LUKS_KEY_DISABLED;
header->keyblock[i].keyMaterialOffset = currentSector;
header->keyblock[i].stripes = stripes;
currentSector = size_round_up(currentSector + blocksPerStripeSet,
LUKS_ALIGN_KEYSLOTS / SECTOR_SIZE);
}
if (detached_metadata_device) {
/* for separate metadata device use alignPayload directly */
header->payloadOffset = alignPayload;
} else {
/* alignOffset - offset from natural device alignment provided by topology info */
currentSector = size_round_up(currentSector, alignPayload);
header->payloadOffset = currentSector + alignOffset;
}
uuid_unparse(partitionUuid, header->uuid);
log_dbg("Data offset %d, UUID %s, digest iterations %" PRIu32,
header->payloadOffset, header->uuid, header->mkDigestIterations);
return 0;
}
int LUKS_hdr_uuid_set(
struct luks_phdr *hdr,
const char *uuid,
struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
uuid_t partitionUuid;
if (uuid && uuid_parse(uuid, partitionUuid) == -1) {
log_err(ctx, _("Wrong LUKS UUID format provided.\n"));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!uuid)
uuid_generate(partitionUuid);
uuid_unparse(partitionUuid, hdr->uuid);
return LUKS_write_phdr(hdr, ctx);
}
int LUKS_set_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
const char *password, size_t passwordLen,
struct luks_phdr *hdr, struct volume_key *vk,
uint32_t iteration_time_ms,
uint64_t *PBKDF2_per_sec,
struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
struct volume_key *derived_key;
char *AfKey = NULL;
size_t AFEKSize;
uint64_t PBKDF2_temp;
int r;
if(hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].active != LUKS_KEY_DISABLED) {
log_err(ctx, _("Key slot %d active, purge first.\n"), keyIndex);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* LUKS keyslot has always at least 4000 stripes accoding to specification */
if(hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes < 4000) {
log_err(ctx, _("Key slot %d material includes too few stripes. Header manipulation?\n"),
keyIndex);
return -EINVAL;
}
log_dbg("Calculating data for key slot %d", keyIndex);
r = crypt_benchmark_kdf(ctx, "pbkdf2", hdr->hashSpec,
"foo", 3, "bar", 3, PBKDF2_per_sec);
if (r < 0) {
log_err(ctx, _("Not compatible PBKDF2 options (using hash algorithm %s).\n"),
hdr->hashSpec);
return r;
}
/*
* Avoid floating point operation
* Final iteration count is at least LUKS_SLOT_ITERATIONS_MIN
*/
PBKDF2_temp = *PBKDF2_per_sec * (uint64_t)iteration_time_ms;
PBKDF2_temp /= 1024;
if (PBKDF2_temp > UINT32_MAX)
PBKDF2_temp = UINT32_MAX;
hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations = at_least((uint32_t)PBKDF2_temp,
LUKS_SLOT_ITERATIONS_MIN);
log_dbg("Key slot %d use %" PRIu32 " password iterations.", keyIndex, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations);
derived_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(hdr->keyBytes, NULL);
if (!derived_key)
return -ENOMEM;
r = crypt_random_get(ctx, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordSalt,
LUKS_SALTSIZE, CRYPT_RND_SALT);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
r = crypt_pbkdf("pbkdf2", hdr->hashSpec, password, passwordLen,
hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
derived_key->key, hdr->keyBytes,
hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
/*
* AF splitting, the masterkey stored in vk->key is split to AfKey
*/
assert(vk->keylength == hdr->keyBytes);
AFEKSize = AF_split_sectors(vk->keylength, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes) * SECTOR_SIZE;
AfKey = crypt_safe_alloc(AFEKSize);
if (!AfKey) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
log_dbg("Using hash %s for AF in key slot %d, %d stripes",
hdr->hashSpec, keyIndex, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes);
r = AF_split(vk->key,AfKey,vk->keylength,hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes,hdr->hashSpec);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
log_dbg("Updating key slot %d [0x%04x] area.", keyIndex,
hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset << 9);
/* Encryption via dm */
r = LUKS_encrypt_to_storage(AfKey,
AFEKSize,
hdr->cipherName, hdr->cipherMode,
derived_key,
hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset,
ctx);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
/* Mark the key as active in phdr */
r = LUKS_keyslot_set(hdr, (int)keyIndex, 1);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
r = LUKS_write_phdr(hdr, ctx);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
crypt_safe_free(AfKey);
crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
return r;
}
/* Check whether a volume key is invalid. */
int LUKS_verify_volume_key(const struct luks_phdr *hdr,
const struct volume_key *vk)
{
char checkHashBuf[LUKS_DIGESTSIZE];
if (crypt_pbkdf("pbkdf2", hdr->hashSpec, vk->key, vk->keylength,
hdr->mkDigestSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
checkHashBuf, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE,
hdr->mkDigestIterations) < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (memcmp(checkHashBuf, hdr->mkDigest, LUKS_DIGESTSIZE))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
/* Try to open a particular key slot */
static int LUKS_open_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
const char *password,
size_t passwordLen,
struct luks_phdr *hdr,
struct volume_key *vk,
struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
crypt_keyslot_info ki = LUKS_keyslot_info(hdr, keyIndex);
struct volume_key *derived_key;
char *AfKey;
size_t AFEKSize;
int r;
log_dbg("Trying to open key slot %d [%s].", keyIndex,
dbg_slot_state(ki));
if (ki < CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE)
return -ENOENT;
derived_key = crypt_alloc_volume_key(hdr->keyBytes, NULL);
if (!derived_key)
return -ENOMEM;
assert(vk->keylength == hdr->keyBytes);
AFEKSize = AF_split_sectors(vk->keylength, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes) * SECTOR_SIZE;
AfKey = crypt_safe_alloc(AFEKSize);
if (!AfKey) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
r = crypt_pbkdf("pbkdf2", hdr->hashSpec, password, passwordLen,
hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordSalt, LUKS_SALTSIZE,
derived_key->key, hdr->keyBytes,
hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
log_dbg("Reading key slot %d area.", keyIndex);
r = LUKS_decrypt_from_storage(AfKey,
AFEKSize,
hdr->cipherName, hdr->cipherMode,
derived_key,
hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset,
ctx);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
r = AF_merge(AfKey,vk->key,vk->keylength,hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes,hdr->hashSpec);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
r = LUKS_verify_volume_key(hdr, vk);
/* Allow only empty passphrase with null cipher */
if (!r && !strcmp(hdr->cipherName, "cipher_null") && passwordLen)
r = -EPERM;
if (!r)
log_verbose(ctx, _("Key slot %d unlocked.\n"), keyIndex);
out:
crypt_safe_free(AfKey);
crypt_free_volume_key(derived_key);
return r;
}
int LUKS_open_key_with_hdr(int keyIndex,
const char *password,
size_t passwordLen,
struct luks_phdr *hdr,
struct volume_key **vk,
struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
unsigned int i;
int r;
*vk = crypt_alloc_volume_key(hdr->keyBytes, NULL);
if (keyIndex >= 0) {
r = LUKS_open_key(keyIndex, password, passwordLen, hdr, *vk, ctx);
return (r < 0) ? r : keyIndex;
}
for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++) {
r = LUKS_open_key(i, password, passwordLen, hdr, *vk, ctx);
if(r == 0)
return i;
/* Do not retry for errors that are no -EPERM or -ENOENT,
former meaning password wrong, latter key slot inactive */
if ((r != -EPERM) && (r != -ENOENT))
return r;
}
/* Warning, early returns above */
log_err(ctx, _("No key available with this passphrase.\n"));
return -EPERM;
}
int LUKS_del_key(unsigned int keyIndex,
struct luks_phdr *hdr,
struct crypt_device *ctx)
{
struct device *device = crypt_metadata_device(ctx);
unsigned int startOffset, endOffset;
int r;
r = LUKS_read_phdr(hdr, 1, 0, ctx);
if (r)
return r;
r = LUKS_keyslot_set(hdr, keyIndex, 0);
if (r) {
log_err(ctx, _("Key slot %d is invalid, please select keyslot between 0 and %d.\n"),
keyIndex, LUKS_NUMKEYS - 1);
return r;
}
/* secure deletion of key material */
startOffset = hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].keyMaterialOffset;
endOffset = startOffset + AF_split_sectors(hdr->keyBytes, hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].stripes);
r = crypt_wipe(device, startOffset * SECTOR_SIZE,
(endOffset - startOffset) * SECTOR_SIZE,
CRYPT_WIPE_DISK, 0);
if (r) {
if (r == -EACCES) {
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot write to device %s, permission denied.\n"),
device_path(device));
r = -EINVAL;
} else
log_err(ctx, _("Cannot wipe device %s.\n"),
device_path(device));
return r;
}
/* Wipe keyslot info */
memset(&hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordSalt, 0, LUKS_SALTSIZE);
hdr->keyblock[keyIndex].passwordIterations = 0;
r = LUKS_write_phdr(hdr, ctx);
return r;
}
crypt_keyslot_info LUKS_keyslot_info(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot)
{
int i;
if(keyslot >= LUKS_NUMKEYS || keyslot < 0)
return CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID;
if (hdr->keyblock[keyslot].active == LUKS_KEY_DISABLED)
return CRYPT_SLOT_INACTIVE;
if (hdr->keyblock[keyslot].active != LUKS_KEY_ENABLED)
return CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID;
for(i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++)
if(i != keyslot && hdr->keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_ENABLED)
return CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE;
return CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST;
}
int LUKS_keyslot_find_empty(struct luks_phdr *hdr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++)
if(hdr->keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_DISABLED)
break;
if (i == LUKS_NUMKEYS)
return -EINVAL;
return i;
}
int LUKS_keyslot_active_count(struct luks_phdr *hdr)
{
int i, num = 0;
for (i = 0; i < LUKS_NUMKEYS; i++)
if(hdr->keyblock[i].active == LUKS_KEY_ENABLED)
num++;
return num;
}
int LUKS_keyslot_set(struct luks_phdr *hdr, int keyslot, int enable)
{
crypt_keyslot_info ki = LUKS_keyslot_info(hdr, keyslot);
if (ki == CRYPT_SLOT_INVALID)
return -EINVAL;
hdr->keyblock[keyslot].active = enable ? LUKS_KEY_ENABLED : LUKS_KEY_DISABLED;
log_dbg("Key slot %d was %s in LUKS header.", keyslot, enable ? "enabled" : "disabled");
return 0;
}
int LUKS1_activate(struct crypt_device *cd,
const char *name,
struct volume_key *vk,
uint32_t flags)
{
int r;
char *dm_cipher = NULL;
enum devcheck device_check;
struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd = {
.target = DM_CRYPT,
.uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd),
.flags = flags,
.size = 0,
.data_device = crypt_data_device(cd),
.u.crypt = {
.cipher = NULL,
.vk = vk,
.offset = crypt_get_data_offset(cd),
.iv_offset = 0,
}
};
if (dmd.flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED)
device_check = DEV_SHARED;
else
device_check = DEV_EXCL;
r = device_block_adjust(cd, dmd.data_device, device_check,
dmd.u.crypt.offset, &dmd.size, &dmd.flags);
if (r)
return r;
r = asprintf(&dm_cipher, "%s-%s", crypt_get_cipher(cd), crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd));
if (r < 0)
return -ENOMEM;
dmd.u.crypt.cipher = dm_cipher;
r = dm_create_device(cd, name, CRYPT_LUKS1, &dmd, 0);
free(dm_cipher);
return r;
}