blob: 8ed18f69cda9d30a7843b2b66053d69da0707bf3 [file] [log] [blame]
/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
/*
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "nssrenam.h"
#include "nss.h"
#include "ssl.h"
#include "sslproto.h"
#include "sslimpl.h"
#include "pk11pub.h"
#include "ssl3ext.h"
#include "ssl3exthandle.h"
#include "tls13esni.h"
#include "tls13exthandle.h"
SECStatus
tls13_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
const sslServerCert *serverCert = ss->sec.serverCert;
const SECItem *item;
SECStatus rv;
if (!serverCert->certStatusArray ||
!serverCert->certStatusArray->len) {
return SECSuccess;
}
item = &serverCert->certStatusArray->items[0];
/* Only send the first entry. */
/* status_type == ocsp */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 1 /*ocsp*/, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* opaque OCSPResponse<1..2^24-1> */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, item->data, item->len, 3);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11] Section 6.3.2.3.
*
* struct {
* NamedGroup group;
* opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
* } KeyShareEntry;
*
* struct {
* select (role) {
* case client:
* KeyShareEntry client_shares<4..2^16-1>;
*
* case server:
* KeyShareEntry server_share;
* }
* } KeyShare;
*
* DH is Section 6.3.2.3.1.
*
* opaque dh_Y<1..2^16-1>;
*
* ECDH is Section 6.3.2.3.2.
*
* opaque point <1..2^8-1>;
*/
PRUint32
tls13_SizeOfKeyShareEntry(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
{
/* Size = NamedGroup(2) + length(2) + opaque<?> share */
switch (pubKey->keyType) {
case ecKey:
return 2 + 2 + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len;
case dhKey:
return 2 + 2 + pubKey->u.dh.prime.len;
default:
PORT_Assert(0);
}
return 0;
}
SECStatus
tls13_EncodeKeyShareEntry(sslBuffer *buf, SSLNamedGroup group,
SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
{
SECStatus rv;
unsigned int size = tls13_SizeOfKeyShareEntry(pubKey);
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, group, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv;
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, size - 4, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv;
switch (pubKey->keyType) {
case ecKey:
rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data,
pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len);
break;
case dhKey:
rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(buf, pubKey, PR_FALSE);
break;
default:
PORT_Assert(0);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
break;
}
return rv;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ClientSendKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
PRCList *cursor;
unsigned int extStart;
unsigned int lengthOffset;
if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Optimistically try to send an ECDHE key using the
* preexisting key (in future will be keys) */
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send client key share xtn",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
extStart = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(buf);
/* Save the offset to the length. */
rv = sslBuffer_Skip(buf, 2, &lengthOffset);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs);
cursor != &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs;
cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) {
sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)cursor;
rv = tls13_EncodeKeyShareEntry(buf,
keyPair->group->name,
keyPair->keys->pubKey);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
}
rv = sslBuffer_InsertLength(buf, lengthOffset, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = SECITEM_MakeItem(NULL, &xtnData->keyShareExtension,
SSL_BUFFER_BASE(buf) + extStart,
SSL_BUFFER_LEN(buf) - extStart);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_DecodeKeyShareEntry(sslReader *rdr, TLS13KeyShareEntry **ksp)
{
SECStatus rv;
PRUint64 group;
const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef;
TLS13KeyShareEntry *ks = NULL;
sslReadBuffer share;
rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(rdr, 2, &group);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
groupDef = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(group);
rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(rdr, 2, &share);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
/* This has to happen here because we want to consume
* the entire entry even if the group is unknown
* or disabled. */
/* If the group is disabled, continue. */
if (!groupDef) {
return SECSuccess;
}
ks = PORT_ZNew(TLS13KeyShareEntry);
if (!ks) {
goto loser;
}
ks->group = groupDef;
rv = SECITEM_MakeItem(NULL, &ks->key_exchange,
share.buf, share.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
*ksp = ks;
return SECSuccess;
loser:
tls13_DestroyKeyShareEntry(ks);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Handle an incoming KeyShare extension at the client and copy to
* |xtnData->remoteKeyShares| for future use. The key
* share is processed in tls13_HandleServerKeyShare(). */
SECStatus
tls13_ClientHandleKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&xtnData->remoteKeyShares));
TLS13KeyShareEntry *ks = NULL;
PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
/* The server must not send this extension when negotiating < TLS 1.3. */
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION);
return SECFailure;
}
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle key_share extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
sslReader rdr = SSL_READER(data->data, data->len);
rv = tls13_DecodeKeyShareEntry(&rdr, &ks);
if ((rv != SECSuccess) || !ks) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE);
return SECFailure;
}
if (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&rdr)) {
tls13_DestroyKeyShareEntry(ks);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE);
return SECFailure;
}
PR_APPEND_LINK(&ks->link, &xtnData->remoteKeyShares);
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ClientHandleKeyShareXtnHrr(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
PRUint32 tmp;
const sslNamedGroupDef *group;
PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
PORT_Assert(ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle key_share extension in HRR",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure; /* error code already set */
}
if (data->len) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST);
return SECFailure;
}
group = ssl_LookupNamedGroup((SSLNamedGroup)tmp);
/* If the group is not enabled, or we already have a share for the
* requested group, abort. */
if (!ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, group) ||
ssl_HaveEphemeralKeyPair(ss, group)) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Now delete all the key shares per [draft-ietf-tls-tls13 S 4.1.2] */
ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss));
/* And replace with our new share. */
rv = tls13_AddKeyShare(CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss), group);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Handle an incoming KeyShare extension at the server and copy to
* |xtnData->remoteKeyShares| for future use. The key
* share is processed in tls13_HandleClientKeyShare(). */
SECStatus
tls13_ServerHandleKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
PRUint32 length;
PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer);
PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&xtnData->remoteKeyShares));
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle key_share extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* Redundant length because of TLS encoding (this vector consumes
* the entire extension.) */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &length, 2, &data->data,
&data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
if (length != data->len) {
/* Check for consistency */
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE);
goto loser;
}
sslReader rdr = SSL_READER(data->data, data->len);
while (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&rdr)) {
TLS13KeyShareEntry *ks = NULL;
rv = tls13_DecodeKeyShareEntry(&rdr, &ks);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE);
goto loser;
}
if (ks) {
/* |ks| == NULL if this is an unknown group. */
PR_APPEND_LINK(&ks->link, &xtnData->remoteKeyShares);
}
}
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] =
ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn;
return SECSuccess;
loser:
tls13_DestroyKeyShares(&xtnData->remoteKeyShares);
return SECFailure;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerSendKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair;
/* There should be exactly one key share. */
PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs));
PORT_Assert(PR_PREV_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs) ==
PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs));
keyPair = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs);
rv = tls13_EncodeKeyShareEntry(buf, keyPair->group->name,
keyPair->keys->pubKey);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Called by clients.
*
* struct {
* opaque identity<0..2^16-1>;
* uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age;
* } PskIdentity;
*
* opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>;
*
* struct {
* select (Handshake.msg_type) {
* case client_hello:
* PskIdentity identities<6..2^16-1>;
* PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>;
*
* case server_hello:
* uint16 selected_identity;
* };
*
* } PreSharedKeyExtension;
* Presently the only way to get a PSK is by resumption, so this is
* really a ticket label and there will be at most one.
*/
SECStatus
tls13_ClientSendPreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
NewSessionTicket *session_ticket;
PRTime age;
const static PRUint8 binder[TLS13_MAX_FINISHED_SIZE] = { 0 };
unsigned int binderLen;
SECStatus rv;
/* We only set statelessResume on the client in TLS 1.3 code. */
if (!ss->statelessResume) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Save where this extension starts so that if we have to add padding, it
* can be inserted before this extension. */
PORT_Assert(buf->len >= 4);
xtnData->lastXtnOffset = buf->len - 4;
PORT_Assert(ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
PORT_Assert(ss->sec.ci.sid->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
/* Send a single ticket identity. */
session_ticket = &ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket;
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 2 + /* identity length */
session_ticket->ticket.len + /* ticket */
4 /* obfuscated_ticket_age */,
2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, session_ticket->ticket.data,
session_ticket->ticket.len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* Obfuscated age. */
age = ssl_TimeUsec() - session_ticket->received_timestamp;
age /= PR_USEC_PER_MSEC;
age += session_ticket->ticket_age_add;
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, age, 4);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* Write out the binder list length. */
binderLen = tls13_GetHashSize(ss);
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, binderLen + 1, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* Write zeroes for the binder for the moment. */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, binder, binderLen, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Sending PreSharedKey value",
session_ticket->ticket.data,
session_ticket->ticket.len));
xtnData->sentSessionTicketInClientHello = PR_TRUE;
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
loser:
xtnData->ticketTimestampVerified = PR_FALSE;
return SECFailure;
}
/* Handle a TLS 1.3 PreSharedKey Extension. We only accept PSKs
* that contain session tickets. */
SECStatus
tls13_ServerHandlePreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECItem inner;
SECStatus rv;
unsigned int numIdentities = 0;
unsigned int numBinders = 0;
SECItem *appToken;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle pre_shared_key extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* If we are doing < TLS 1.3, then ignore this. */
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* The application token is set via the cookie extension if this is the
* second ClientHello. Don't set it twice. The cookie extension handler
* sets |helloRetry| and that will have been called already because this
* extension always comes last. */
if (!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
appToken = &xtnData->applicationToken;
} else {
appToken = NULL;
}
/* Parse the identities list. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &inner, 2,
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
while (inner.len) {
SECItem label;
PRUint32 obfuscatedAge;
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &label, 2,
&inner.data, &inner.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv;
if (!label.len) {
goto alert_loser;
}
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &obfuscatedAge, 4,
&inner.data, &inner.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv;
if (!numIdentities) {
PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Handling PreSharedKey value",
label.data, label.len));
rv = ssl3_ProcessSessionTicketCommon(
CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss), &label, appToken);
/* This only happens if we have an internal error, not
* a malformed ticket. Bogus tickets just don't resume
* and return SECSuccess. */
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return SECFailure;
if (ss->sec.ci.sid) {
/* xtnData->ticketAge contains the baseline we use for
* calculating the ticket age (i.e., our RTT estimate less the
* value of ticket_age_add).
*
* Add that to the obfuscated ticket age to recover the client's
* view of the ticket age plus the estimated RTT.
*
* See ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket() for details. */
xtnData->ticketAge += obfuscatedAge;
}
}
++numIdentities;
}
xtnData->pskBindersLen = data->len;
/* Parse the binders list. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss,
&inner, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return SECFailure;
if (data->len) {
goto alert_loser;
}
while (inner.len) {
SECItem binder;
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &binder, 1,
&inner.data, &inner.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv;
if (binder.len < 32) {
goto alert_loser;
}
if (!numBinders) {
xtnData->pskBinder = binder;
}
++numBinders;
}
if (numBinders != numIdentities)
goto alert_loser;
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. Note that this does not
* mean we are resuming. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn;
return SECSuccess;
alert_loser:
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PRE_SHARED_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerSendPreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
/* We only process the first session ticket the client sends,
* so the index is always 0. */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Handle a TLS 1.3 PreSharedKey Extension. We only accept PSKs
* that contain session tickets. */
SECStatus
tls13_ClientHandlePreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
PRUint32 index;
SECStatus rv;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle pre_shared_key extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* The server must not send this extension when negotiating < TLS 1.3. */
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &index, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return SECFailure;
/* This should be the end of the extension. */
if (data->len) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PRE_SHARED_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
/* We only sent one PSK label so index must be equal to 0 */
if (index) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PRE_SHARED_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn;
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* struct { } EarlyDataIndication;
*/
SECStatus
tls13_ClientSendEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
if (!tls13_ClientAllow0Rtt(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid)) {
return SECSuccess;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerHandleEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle early_data extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* If we are doing < TLS 1.3, then ignore this. */
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unsupported_extension);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
return SECFailure;
}
if (data->len) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_EARLY_DATA);
return SECFailure;
}
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* This will only be called if we also offered the extension. */
SECStatus
tls13_ClientHandleEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle early_data extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* The server must not send this extension when negotiating < TLS 1.3. */
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION);
return SECFailure;
}
if (data->len) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_EARLY_DATA);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ClientHandleTicketEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
PRUint32 utmp;
SECStatus rv;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle ticket early_data extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* The server must not send this extension when negotiating < TLS 1.3. */
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshake(ss, &utmp, sizeof(utmp),
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
return SECFailure;
}
if (data->len) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
return SECFailure;
}
xtnData->max_early_data_size = PR_ntohl(utmp);
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* struct {
* select (Handshake.msg_type) {
* case client_hello:
* ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>;
* case server_hello:
* ProtocolVersion version;
* };
* } SupportedVersions;
*/
SECStatus
tls13_ClientSendSupportedVersionsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
PRUint16 version;
unsigned int lengthOffset;
SECStatus rv;
if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client send supported_versions extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
rv = sslBuffer_Skip(buf, 1, &lengthOffset);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
for (version = ss->vrange.max; version >= ss->vrange.min; --version) {
PRUint16 wire = tls13_EncodeDraftVersion(version,
ss->protocolVariant);
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, wire, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
}
rv = sslBuffer_InsertLength(buf, lengthOffset, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerSendSupportedVersionsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: server send supported_versions extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PRUint16 ver = tls13_EncodeDraftVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3,
ss->protocolVariant);
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ver, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* struct {
* opaque cookie<1..2^16-1>;
* } Cookie;
*/
SECStatus
tls13_ClientHandleHrrCookie(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle cookie extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert(ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
/* IMPORTANT: this is only valid while the HelloRetryRequest is still valid. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(
ss, &CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss)->ssl3.hs.cookie, 2,
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST);
return SECFailure;
}
if (!ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len || data->len) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ClientSendHrrCookieXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ||
!ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len) {
return SECSuccess;
}
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send cookie extension", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.data,
ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerHandleCookieXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle cookie extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &xtnData->cookie, 2,
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
if (xtnData->cookie.len == 0) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
return SECFailure;
}
if (data->len) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn;
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* enum { psk_ke(0), psk_dhe_ke(1), (255) } PskKeyExchangeMode;
*
* struct {
* PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>;
* } PskKeyExchangeModes;
*/
SECStatus
tls13_ClientSendPskModesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
static const PRUint8 ke_modes[] = { tls13_psk_dh_ke };
SECStatus rv;
if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ||
ss->opt.noCache) {
return SECSuccess;
}
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send psk key exchange modes extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, ke_modes, sizeof(ke_modes), 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerHandlePskModesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
/* If we are doing < TLS 1.3, then ignore this. */
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle PSK key exchange modes extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* IMPORTANT: We aren't copying these values, just setting pointers.
* They will only be valid as long as the ClientHello is in memory. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss,
&xtnData->psk_ke_modes, 1,
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv;
if (!xtnData->psk_ke_modes.len || data->len) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] =
ssl_tls13_psk_key_exchange_modes_xtn;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_SendCertAuthoritiesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
unsigned int calen;
const SECItem *name;
unsigned int nnames;
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
rv = ssl_GetCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &calen, &name, &nnames);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
if (!calen) {
return SECSuccess;
}
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, calen, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
while (nnames) {
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, name->data, name->len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
++name;
--nnames;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ClientHandleCertAuthoritiesXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
PLArenaPool *arena;
if (!data->len) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST);
return SECFailure;
}
arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
if (!arena) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
xtnData->certReqAuthorities.arena = arena;
rv = ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs((sslSocket *)ss,
&data->data, &data->len,
&xtnData->certReqAuthorities);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
if (data->len) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST);
goto loser;
}
return SECSuccess;
loser:
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
xtnData->certReqAuthorities.arena = NULL;
return SECFailure;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerSendHrrKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
if (!xtnData->selectedGroup) {
return SECSuccess;
}
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, xtnData->selectedGroup->name, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerSendHrrCookieXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
PORT_Assert(xtnData->cookie.len > 0);
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf,
xtnData->cookie.data, xtnData->cookie.len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ClientSendEsniXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
PRUint8 sniBuf[1024];
PRUint8 hash[64];
sslBuffer sni = SSL_BUFFER(sniBuf);
const ssl3CipherSuiteDef *suiteDef;
ssl3KeyMaterial keyMat;
SSLAEADCipher aead;
PRUint8 outBuf[1024];
int outLen;
unsigned int sniStart;
unsigned int sniLen;
sslBuffer aadInput = SSL_BUFFER_EMPTY;
unsigned int keyShareBufStart;
unsigned int keyShareBufLen;
PORT_Memset(&keyMat, 0, sizeof(keyMat));
if (!ss->xtnData.esniPrivateKey) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* nonce */
rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(
(unsigned char *)xtnData->esniNonce, sizeof(xtnData->esniNonce));
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = sslBuffer_Append(&sni, xtnData->esniNonce, sizeof(xtnData->esniNonce));
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* sni */
sniStart = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&sni);
rv = ssl3_ClientFormatServerNameXtn(ss, ss->url, xtnData, &sni);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
sniLen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&sni) - sniStart;
/* Padding. */
if (ss->esniKeys->paddedLength > sniLen) {
unsigned int paddingRequired = ss->esniKeys->paddedLength - sniLen;
while (paddingRequired--) {
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(&sni, 0, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
}
}
suiteDef = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(xtnData->esniSuite);
PORT_Assert(suiteDef);
if (!suiteDef) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
aead = tls13_GetAead(ssl_GetBulkCipherDef(suiteDef));
if (!aead) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* Format the first part of the extension so we have the
* encoded KeyShareEntry. */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, xtnData->esniSuite, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
keyShareBufStart = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(buf);
rv = tls13_EncodeKeyShareEntry(buf,
xtnData->esniPrivateKey->group->name,
xtnData->esniPrivateKey->keys->pubKey);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
keyShareBufLen = SSL_BUFFER_LEN(buf) - keyShareBufStart;
if (tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(suiteDef->prf_hash) > sizeof(hash)) {
PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = PK11_HashBuf(ssl3_HashTypeToOID(suiteDef->prf_hash),
hash,
ss->esniKeys->data.data,
ss->esniKeys->data.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_Assert(PR_FALSE);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, hash,
tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(suiteDef->prf_hash), 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* Compute the ESNI keys. */
rv = tls13_ComputeESNIKeys(ss, xtnData->peerEsniShare,
xtnData->esniPrivateKey->keys,
suiteDef,
hash,
SSL_BUFFER_BASE(buf) + keyShareBufStart,
keyShareBufLen,
CONST_CAST(PRUint8, ss->ssl3.hs.client_random),
&keyMat);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = tls13_FormatEsniAADInput(&aadInput,
xtnData->keyShareExtension.data,
xtnData->keyShareExtension.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl_DestroyKeyMaterial(&keyMat);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Now encrypt. */
rv = aead(&keyMat, PR_FALSE /* Encrypt */,
outBuf, &outLen, sizeof(outBuf),
SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&sni),
SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&sni),
SSL_BUFFER_BASE(&aadInput),
SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&aadInput));
ssl_DestroyKeyMaterial(&keyMat);
sslBuffer_Clear(&aadInput);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* Encode the rest. */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, outBuf, outLen, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
tls13_ServerSendEsniXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, xtnData->esniNonce, sizeof(xtnData->esniNonce));
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerHandleEsniXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
sslReadBuffer buf;
PRUint8 *plainText = NULL;
int ptLen;
SECStatus rv;
/* If we are doing < TLS 1.3, then ignore this. */
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
if (!ss->esniKeys) {
/* Apparently we used to be configured for ESNI, but
* no longer. This violates the spec, or the client is
* broken. */
return SECFailure;
}
plainText = PORT_ZAlloc(data->len);
if (!plainText) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = tls13_ServerDecryptEsniXtn(ss, data->data, data->len,
plainText, &ptLen, data->len);
if (rv) {
goto loser;
}
/* Read out the interior extension. */
sslReader sniRdr = SSL_READER(plainText, ptLen);
rv = sslRead_Read(&sniRdr, sizeof(xtnData->esniNonce), &buf);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
PORT_Memcpy(xtnData->esniNonce, buf.buf, sizeof(xtnData->esniNonce));
/* We need to capture the whole block with the length. */
SECItem sniItem = { siBuffer, (unsigned char *)SSL_READER_CURRENT(&sniRdr), 0 };
rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(&sniRdr, 2, &buf);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
sniItem.len = buf.len + 2;
/* Check the padding. Note we don't need to do this in constant time
* because it's inside the AEAD boundary. */
/* TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): check that the padding is the right length. */
PRUint64 tmp;
while (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&sniRdr)) {
rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&sniRdr, 1, &tmp);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
if (tmp != 0) {
goto loser;
}
}
rv = ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn(ss, xtnData, &sniItem);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
rv = ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(ss, xtnData,
ssl_tls13_encrypted_sni_xtn,
tls13_ServerSendEsniXtn);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] =
ssl_tls13_encrypted_sni_xtn;
PORT_ZFree(plainText, data->len);
return SECSuccess;
loser:
PORT_ZFree(plainText, data->len);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Function to check the extension. We don't install a handler here
* because we need to check for the presence of the extension as
* well and it's easier to do it in one place. */
SECStatus
tls13_ClientCheckEsniXtn(sslSocket *ss)
{
TLSExtension *esniExtension =
ssl3_FindExtension(ss, ssl_tls13_encrypted_sni_xtn);
if (!esniExtension) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_MISSING_ESNI_EXTENSION, missing_extension);
return SECFailure;
}
if (esniExtension->data.len != sizeof(ss->xtnData.esniNonce)) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ESNI_EXTENSION, illegal_parameter);
return SECFailure;
}
if (0 != NSS_SecureMemcmp(esniExtension->data.data,
ss->xtnData.esniNonce,
sizeof(ss->xtnData.esniNonce))) {
FATAL_ERROR(ss, SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ESNI_EXTENSION, illegal_parameter);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}