| /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public |
| * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this |
| * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ |
| |
| #ifndef _PKCS11N_H_ |
| #define _PKCS11N_H_ |
| |
| /* |
| * pkcs11n.h |
| * |
| * This file contains the NSS-specific type definitions for Cryptoki |
| * (PKCS#11). |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS |
| * |
| * Cryptoki reserves the high half of all the number spaces for |
| * vendor-defined use. I'd like to keep all of our NSS- |
| * specific values together, but not in the oh-so-obvious |
| * 0x80000001, 0x80000002, etc. area. So I've picked an offset, |
| * and constructed values for the beginnings of our spaces. |
| * |
| * Note that some "historical" Netscape values don't fall within |
| * this range. |
| */ |
| #define NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS 0x4E534350 /* NSCP */ |
| |
| /* |
| * NSS-defined object classes |
| * |
| */ |
| #define CKO_NSS (CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS) |
| |
| #define CKO_NSS_CRL (CKO_NSS + 1) |
| #define CKO_NSS_SMIME (CKO_NSS + 2) |
| #define CKO_NSS_TRUST (CKO_NSS + 3) |
| #define CKO_NSS_BUILTIN_ROOT_LIST (CKO_NSS + 4) |
| #define CKO_NSS_NEWSLOT (CKO_NSS + 5) |
| #define CKO_NSS_DELSLOT (CKO_NSS + 6) |
| |
| /* |
| * NSS-defined key types |
| * |
| */ |
| #define CKK_NSS (CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS) |
| |
| #define CKK_NSS_PKCS8 (CKK_NSS + 1) |
| |
| #define CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1 (CKK_NSS + 2) |
| #define CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2 (CKK_NSS + 3) |
| |
| #define CKK_NSS_CHACHA20 (CKK_NSS + 4) |
| |
| /* |
| * NSS-defined certificate types |
| * |
| */ |
| #define CKC_NSS (CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS) |
| |
| /* FAKE PKCS #11 defines */ |
| #define CKA_DIGEST 0x81000000L |
| #define CKA_FLAGS_ONLY 0 /* CKA_CLASS */ |
| |
| /* |
| * NSS-defined object attributes |
| * |
| */ |
| #define CKA_NSS (CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS) |
| |
| #define CKA_NSS_URL (CKA_NSS + 1) |
| #define CKA_NSS_EMAIL (CKA_NSS + 2) |
| #define CKA_NSS_SMIME_INFO (CKA_NSS + 3) |
| #define CKA_NSS_SMIME_TIMESTAMP (CKA_NSS + 4) |
| #define CKA_NSS_PKCS8_SALT (CKA_NSS + 5) |
| #define CKA_NSS_PASSWORD_CHECK (CKA_NSS + 6) |
| #define CKA_NSS_EXPIRES (CKA_NSS + 7) |
| #define CKA_NSS_KRL (CKA_NSS + 8) |
| |
| #define CKA_NSS_PQG_COUNTER (CKA_NSS + 20) |
| #define CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED (CKA_NSS + 21) |
| #define CKA_NSS_PQG_H (CKA_NSS + 22) |
| #define CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED_BITS (CKA_NSS + 23) |
| #define CKA_NSS_MODULE_SPEC (CKA_NSS + 24) |
| #define CKA_NSS_OVERRIDE_EXTENSIONS (CKA_NSS + 25) |
| |
| #define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_SIGNERID (CKA_NSS + 26) |
| #define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_PEERID (CKA_NSS + 27) |
| #define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_GX1 (CKA_NSS + 28) |
| #define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_GX2 (CKA_NSS + 29) |
| #define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_GX3 (CKA_NSS + 30) |
| #define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_GX4 (CKA_NSS + 31) |
| #define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_X2 (CKA_NSS + 32) |
| #define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_X2S (CKA_NSS + 33) |
| |
| #define CKA_NSS_MOZILLA_CA_POLICY (CKA_NSS + 34) |
| |
| /* |
| * Trust attributes: |
| * |
| * If trust goes standard, these probably will too. So I'll |
| * put them all in one place. |
| */ |
| |
| #define CKA_TRUST (CKA_NSS + 0x2000) |
| |
| /* "Usage" key information */ |
| #define CKA_TRUST_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE (CKA_TRUST + 1) |
| #define CKA_TRUST_NON_REPUDIATION (CKA_TRUST + 2) |
| #define CKA_TRUST_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT (CKA_TRUST + 3) |
| #define CKA_TRUST_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT (CKA_TRUST + 4) |
| #define CKA_TRUST_KEY_AGREEMENT (CKA_TRUST + 5) |
| #define CKA_TRUST_KEY_CERT_SIGN (CKA_TRUST + 6) |
| #define CKA_TRUST_CRL_SIGN (CKA_TRUST + 7) |
| |
| /* "Purpose" trust information */ |
| #define CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH (CKA_TRUST + 8) |
| #define CKA_TRUST_CLIENT_AUTH (CKA_TRUST + 9) |
| #define CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING (CKA_TRUST + 10) |
| #define CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION (CKA_TRUST + 11) |
| #define CKA_TRUST_IPSEC_END_SYSTEM (CKA_TRUST + 12) |
| #define CKA_TRUST_IPSEC_TUNNEL (CKA_TRUST + 13) |
| #define CKA_TRUST_IPSEC_USER (CKA_TRUST + 14) |
| #define CKA_TRUST_TIME_STAMPING (CKA_TRUST + 15) |
| #define CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED (CKA_TRUST + 16) |
| |
| #define CKA_CERT_SHA1_HASH (CKA_TRUST + 100) |
| #define CKA_CERT_MD5_HASH (CKA_TRUST + 101) |
| |
| /* NSS trust stuff */ |
| |
| /* HISTORICAL: define used to pass in the database key for DSA private keys */ |
| #define CKA_NETSCAPE_DB 0xD5A0DB00L |
| #define CKA_NETSCAPE_TRUST 0x80000001L |
| |
| /* FAKE PKCS #11 defines */ |
| #define CKM_FAKE_RANDOM 0x80000efeUL |
| #define CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM 0xffffffffUL |
| |
| /* |
| * NSS-defined crypto mechanisms |
| * |
| */ |
| #define CKM_NSS (CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS) |
| |
| #define CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP (CKM_NSS + 1) |
| #define CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD (CKM_NSS + 2) |
| |
| /* HKDF key derivation mechanisms. See CK_NSS_HKDFParams for documentation. */ |
| #define CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA1 (CKM_NSS + 3) |
| #define CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 4) |
| #define CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384 (CKM_NSS + 5) |
| #define CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512 (CKM_NSS + 6) |
| |
| /* J-PAKE round 1 key generation mechanisms. |
| * |
| * Required template attributes: CKA_PRIME, CKA_SUBPRIME, CKA_BASE, |
| * CKA_NSS_JPAKE_SIGNERID |
| * Output key type: CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1 |
| * Output key class: CKO_PRIVATE_KEY |
| * Parameter type: CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params |
| * |
| */ |
| #define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA1 (CKM_NSS + 7) |
| #define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 8) |
| #define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA384 (CKM_NSS + 9) |
| #define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA512 (CKM_NSS + 10) |
| |
| /* J-PAKE round 2 key derivation mechanisms. |
| * |
| * Required template attributes: CKA_NSS_JPAKE_PEERID |
| * Input key type: CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1 |
| * Output key type: CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2 |
| * Output key class: CKO_PRIVATE_KEY |
| * Parameter type: CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params |
| */ |
| #define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA1 (CKM_NSS + 11) |
| #define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 12) |
| #define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA384 (CKM_NSS + 13) |
| #define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA512 (CKM_NSS + 14) |
| |
| /* J-PAKE final key material derivation mechanisms |
| * |
| * Input key type: CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2 |
| * Output key type: CKK_GENERIC_SECRET |
| * Output key class: CKO_SECRET_KEY |
| * Parameter type: CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams |
| * |
| * You must apply a KDF (e.g. CKM_NSS_HKDF_*) to resultant keying material |
| * to get a key with uniformly distributed bits. |
| */ |
| #define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1 (CKM_NSS + 15) |
| #define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 16) |
| #define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384 (CKM_NSS + 17) |
| #define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512 (CKM_NSS + 18) |
| |
| /* Constant-time MAC mechanisms: |
| * |
| * These operations verify a padded, MAC-then-encrypt block of data in |
| * constant-time. Because of the order of operations, the padding bytes are not |
| * protected by the MAC. However, disclosing the value of the padding bytes |
| * gives an attacker the ability to decrypt ciphertexts. Such disclosure can be |
| * as subtle as taking slightly less time to perform the MAC when the padding |
| * is one byte longer. See https://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/ |
| * |
| * CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME: performs an HMAC authentication. |
| * CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME: performs an authentication with SSLv3 MAC. |
| * |
| * Parameter type: CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS |
| */ |
| #define CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME (CKM_NSS + 19) |
| #define CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME (CKM_NSS + 20) |
| |
| /* TLS 1.2 mechanisms */ |
| #define CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 21) |
| #define CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 22) |
| #define CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 23) |
| #define CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 24) |
| |
| /* TLS extended master secret derivation */ |
| #define CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE (CKM_NSS + 25) |
| #define CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH (CKM_NSS + 26) |
| |
| #define CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_KEY_GEN (CKM_NSS + 27) |
| #define CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305 (CKM_NSS + 28) |
| |
| /* Additional PKCS #12 PBE algorithms defined in v1.1 */ |
| #define CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA224_HMAC_KEY_GEN (CKM_NSS + 29) |
| #define CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA256_HMAC_KEY_GEN (CKM_NSS + 30) |
| #define CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA384_HMAC_KEY_GEN (CKM_NSS + 31) |
| #define CKM_NSS_PKCS12_PBE_SHA512_HMAC_KEY_GEN (CKM_NSS + 32) |
| |
| /* |
| * HISTORICAL: |
| * Do not attempt to use these. They are only used by NETSCAPE's internal |
| * PKCS #11 interface. Most of these are place holders for other mechanism |
| * and will change in the future. |
| */ |
| #define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC 0x80000002UL |
| #define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC 0x80000003UL |
| #define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC2_CBC 0x80000004UL |
| #define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC2_CBC 0x80000005UL |
| #define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC4 0x80000006UL |
| #define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC4 0x80000007UL |
| #define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_FAULTY_3DES_CBC 0x80000008UL |
| #define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN 0x80000009UL |
| #define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN 0x8000000aUL |
| #define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN 0x8000000bUL |
| |
| #define CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL 0x80000373UL |
| |
| typedef struct CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue { |
| CK_BYTE *pGX; |
| CK_ULONG ulGXLen; |
| CK_BYTE *pGV; |
| CK_ULONG ulGVLen; |
| CK_BYTE *pR; |
| CK_ULONG ulRLen; |
| } CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue; |
| |
| typedef struct CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params { |
| CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue gx1; /* out */ |
| CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue gx2; /* out */ |
| } CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params; |
| |
| typedef struct CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params { |
| CK_BYTE *pSharedKey; /* in */ |
| CK_ULONG ulSharedKeyLen; /* in */ |
| CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue gx3; /* in */ |
| CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue gx4; /* in */ |
| CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue A; /* out */ |
| } CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params; |
| |
| typedef struct CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams { |
| CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue B; /* in */ |
| } CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams; |
| |
| /* macAlg: the MAC algorithm to use. This determines the hash function used in |
| * the HMAC/SSLv3 MAC calculations. |
| * ulBodyTotalLen: the total length of the data, including padding bytes and |
| * padding length. |
| * pHeader: points to a block of data that contains additional data to |
| * authenticate. For TLS this includes the sequence number etc. For SSLv3, |
| * this also includes the initial padding bytes. |
| * |
| * NOTE: the softoken's implementation of CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME and |
| * CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME requires that the sum of ulBodyTotalLen |
| * and ulHeaderLen be much smaller than 2^32 / 8 bytes because it uses an |
| * unsigned int variable to represent the length in bits. This should not |
| * be a problem because the SSL/TLS protocol limits the size of an SSL |
| * record to something considerably less than 2^32 bytes. |
| */ |
| typedef struct CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS { |
| CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macAlg; /* in */ |
| CK_ULONG ulBodyTotalLen; /* in */ |
| CK_BYTE *pHeader; /* in */ |
| CK_ULONG ulHeaderLen; /* in */ |
| } CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS; |
| |
| typedef struct CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS { |
| CK_BYTE_PTR pNonce; |
| CK_ULONG ulNonceLen; |
| CK_BYTE_PTR pAAD; |
| CK_ULONG ulAADLen; |
| CK_ULONG ulTagLen; |
| } CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS; |
| |
| /* |
| * NSS-defined return values |
| * |
| */ |
| #define CKR_NSS (CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS) |
| |
| #define CKR_NSS_CERTDB_FAILED (CKR_NSS + 1) |
| #define CKR_NSS_KEYDB_FAILED (CKR_NSS + 2) |
| |
| /* Mandatory parameter for the CKM_NSS_HKDF_* key deriviation mechanisms. |
| See RFC 5869. |
| |
| bExtract: If set, HKDF-Extract will be applied to the input key. If |
| the optional salt is given, it is used; otherwise, the salt is |
| set to a sequence of zeros equal in length to the HMAC output. |
| If bExpand is not set, then the key template given to |
| C_DeriveKey must indicate an output key size less than or equal |
| to the output size of the HMAC. |
| |
| bExpand: If set, HKDF-Expand will be applied to the input key (if |
| bExtract is not set) or to the result of HKDF-Extract (if |
| bExtract is set). Any info given in the optional pInfo field will |
| be included in the calculation. |
| |
| The size of the output key must be specified in the template passed to |
| C_DeriveKey. |
| */ |
| typedef struct CK_NSS_HKDFParams { |
| CK_BBOOL bExtract; |
| CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt; |
| CK_ULONG ulSaltLen; |
| CK_BBOOL bExpand; |
| CK_BYTE_PTR pInfo; |
| CK_ULONG ulInfoLen; |
| } CK_NSS_HKDFParams; |
| |
| /* |
| * Parameter for the TLS extended master secret key derivation mechanisms: |
| * |
| * * CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE |
| * * CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH |
| * |
| * For the TLS 1.2 PRF, the prfHashMechanism parameter determines the hash |
| * function used. For earlier versions of the PRF, set the prfHashMechanism |
| * value to CKM_TLS_PRF. |
| * |
| * The session hash input is expected to be the output of the same hash |
| * function as the PRF uses (as required by draft-ietf-tls-session-hash). So |
| * the ulSessionHashLen member must be equal the output length of the hash |
| * function specified by the prfHashMechanism member (or, for pre-TLS 1.2 PRF, |
| * the length of concatenated MD5 and SHA-1 digests). |
| * |
| */ |
| typedef struct CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { |
| CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfHashMechanism; |
| CK_BYTE_PTR pSessionHash; |
| CK_ULONG ulSessionHashLen; |
| CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion; |
| } CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; |
| |
| /* |
| * Trust info |
| * |
| * This isn't part of the Cryptoki standard (yet), so I'm putting |
| * all the definitions here. Some of this would move to nssckt.h |
| * if trust info were made part of the standard. In view of this |
| * possibility, I'm putting my (NSS) values in the NSS |
| * vendor space, like everything else. |
| */ |
| |
| typedef CK_ULONG CK_TRUST; |
| |
| /* The following trust types are defined: */ |
| #define CKT_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 |
| |
| #define CKT_NSS (CKT_VENDOR_DEFINED | NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS) |
| |
| /* If trust goes standard, these'll probably drop out of vendor space. */ |
| #define CKT_NSS_TRUSTED (CKT_NSS + 1) |
| #define CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR (CKT_NSS + 2) |
| #define CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST (CKT_NSS + 3) |
| #define CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED (CKT_NSS + 10) |
| #define CKT_NSS_TRUST_UNKNOWN (CKT_NSS + 5) /* default */ |
| |
| /* |
| * These may well remain NSS-specific; I'm only using them |
| * to cache resolution data. |
| */ |
| #define CKT_NSS_VALID_DELEGATOR (CKT_NSS + 11) |
| |
| /* |
| * old definitions. They still exist, but the plain meaning of the |
| * labels have never been accurate to what was really implemented. |
| * The new labels correctly reflect what the values effectively mean. |
| */ |
| #if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ > 3) |
| /* make GCC warn when we use these #defines */ |
| /* |
| * This is really painful because GCC doesn't allow us to mark random |
| * #defines as deprecated. We can only mark the following: |
| * functions, variables, and types. |
| * const variables will create extra storage for everyone including this |
| * header file, so it's undesirable. |
| * functions could be inlined to prevent storage creation, but will fail |
| * when constant values are expected (like switch statements). |
| * enum types do not seem to pay attention to the deprecated attribute. |
| * |
| * That leaves typedefs. We declare new types that we then deprecate, then |
| * cast the resulting value to the deprecated type in the #define, thus |
| * producting the warning when the #define is used. |
| */ |
| #if (__GNUC__ == 4) && (__GNUC_MINOR__ < 5) |
| /* The mac doesn't like the friendlier deprecate messages. I'm assuming this |
| * is a gcc version issue rather than mac or ppc specific */ |
| typedef CK_TRUST __CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED __attribute__((deprecated)); |
| typedef CK_TRUST __CKT_NSS_VALID __attribute__((deprecated)); |
| typedef CK_TRUST __CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY __attribute__((deprecated)); |
| #else |
| /* when possible, get a full deprecation warning. This works on gcc 4.5 |
| * it may work on earlier versions of gcc */ |
| typedef CK_TRUST __CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED __attribute__((deprecated("CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED really means CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST"))); |
| typedef CK_TRUST __CKT_NSS_VALID __attribute__((deprecated("CKT_NSS_VALID really means CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED"))); |
| typedef CK_TRUST __CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY __attribute__((deprecated("CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY really functions as CKT_NSS_TRUST_UNKNOWN"))); |
| #endif |
| #define CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED ((__CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED)CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST) |
| #define CKT_NSS_VALID ((__CKT_NSS_VALID)CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED) |
| /* keep the old value for compatibility reasons*/ |
| #define CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY ((__CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY)(CKT_NSS + 4)) |
| #else |
| #ifdef _WIN32 |
| /* This magic gets the windows compiler to give us a deprecation |
| * warning */ |
| #pragma deprecated(CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED, CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY, CKT_NSS_VALID) |
| #endif |
| /* CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED really means CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST */ |
| #define CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST |
| /* CKT_NSS_VALID really means CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED */ |
| #define CKT_NSS_VALID CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED |
| /* CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY was always treated as CKT_NSS_TRUST_UNKNOWN */ |
| #define CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY (CKT_NSS + 4) /*really means trust unknown*/ |
| #endif |
| |
| /* don't leave old programs in a lurch just yet, give them the old NETSCAPE |
| * synonym */ |
| #define CKO_NETSCAPE_CRL CKO_NSS_CRL |
| #define CKO_NETSCAPE_SMIME CKO_NSS_SMIME |
| #define CKO_NETSCAPE_TRUST CKO_NSS_TRUST |
| #define CKO_NETSCAPE_BUILTIN_ROOT_LIST CKO_NSS_BUILTIN_ROOT_LIST |
| #define CKO_NETSCAPE_NEWSLOT CKO_NSS_NEWSLOT |
| #define CKO_NETSCAPE_DELSLOT CKO_NSS_DELSLOT |
| #define CKK_NETSCAPE_PKCS8 CKK_NSS_PKCS8 |
| #define CKA_NETSCAPE_URL CKA_NSS_URL |
| #define CKA_NETSCAPE_EMAIL CKA_NSS_EMAIL |
| #define CKA_NETSCAPE_SMIME_INFO CKA_NSS_SMIME_INFO |
| #define CKA_NETSCAPE_SMIME_TIMESTAMP CKA_NSS_SMIME_TIMESTAMP |
| #define CKA_NETSCAPE_PKCS8_SALT CKA_NSS_PKCS8_SALT |
| #define CKA_NETSCAPE_PASSWORD_CHECK CKA_NSS_PASSWORD_CHECK |
| #define CKA_NETSCAPE_EXPIRES CKA_NSS_EXPIRES |
| #define CKA_NETSCAPE_KRL CKA_NSS_KRL |
| #define CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_COUNTER CKA_NSS_PQG_COUNTER |
| #define CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED |
| #define CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_H CKA_NSS_PQG_H |
| #define CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED_BITS |
| #define CKA_NETSCAPE_MODULE_SPEC CKA_NSS_MODULE_SPEC |
| #define CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP |
| #define CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD |
| #define CKR_NETSCAPE_CERTDB_FAILED CKR_NSS_CERTDB_FAILED |
| #define CKR_NETSCAPE_KEYDB_FAILED CKR_NSS_KEYDB_FAILED |
| |
| #define CKT_NETSCAPE_TRUSTED CKT_NSS_TRUSTED |
| #define CKT_NETSCAPE_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR |
| #define CKT_NETSCAPE_UNTRUSTED CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED |
| #define CKT_NETSCAPE_MUST_VERIFY CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY |
| #define CKT_NETSCAPE_TRUST_UNKNOWN CKT_NSS_TRUST_UNKNOWN |
| #define CKT_NETSCAPE_VALID CKT_NSS_VALID |
| #define CKT_NETSCAPE_VALID_DELEGATOR CKT_NSS_VALID_DELEGATOR |
| |
| /* |
| * These are not really PKCS #11 values specifically. They are the 'loadable' |
| * module spec NSS uses. The are available for others to use as well, but not |
| * part of the formal PKCS #11 spec. |
| * |
| * The function 'FIND' returns an array of PKCS #11 initialization strings |
| * The function 'ADD' takes a PKCS #11 initialization string and stores it. |
| * The function 'DEL' takes a 'name= library=' value and deletes the associated |
| * string. |
| * The function 'RELEASE' frees the array returned by 'FIND' |
| */ |
| #define SECMOD_MODULE_DB_FUNCTION_FIND 0 |
| #define SECMOD_MODULE_DB_FUNCTION_ADD 1 |
| #define SECMOD_MODULE_DB_FUNCTION_DEL 2 |
| #define SECMOD_MODULE_DB_FUNCTION_RELEASE 3 |
| typedef char **(PR_CALLBACK *SECMODModuleDBFunc)(unsigned long function, |
| char *parameters, void *moduleSpec); |
| |
| /* softoken slot ID's */ |
| #define SFTK_MIN_USER_SLOT_ID 4 |
| #define SFTK_MAX_USER_SLOT_ID 100 |
| #define SFTK_MIN_FIPS_USER_SLOT_ID 101 |
| #define SFTK_MAX_FIPS_USER_SLOT_ID 127 |
| |
| #endif /* _PKCS11N_H_ */ |
